kool kitty89

Then what does that make the Macintosh or PC? Bingo. That was the point where I think things went south on them. This machine was a marketing disaster, and _right_ at the worst possible time. Had it done even a little better they would have had time to move production overseas without killing the entire line while that happened. By the time the Tramiels arrived I don't think Atari was Atari any more. More like the bloated pig that Microsoft is today, or Apple was in the 90s - developer heavy, lurching from project to project, developing lots of things people don't actually want because they said they did in a poll. The sad thing is the ST. Having owned and used one for a long time, I can say without hesitation that it was least favorite computer. There was no "design" behind it, just a bunch of off-the-shelf bits shoveled together into a box as cheap as possible. Not that that's a bad thing, but it was no Atari. Nope, way off base. The 5200 was behind s lot of other problems that were much worse: it was a symptom more than anything else. (just like the ET fiasco) Atari/Warner management was a mess, the distribution system was the main cause of the crash (led to an inflated market and the so-called glut), and Atari themselves became rather bloated on top of that (in large part because of that inflation). And no, it was FAR from too late, but indeed, 1982 was the time to act if catastrophe was to be averted entirely. After that, things were still far from irreparable, and while James Morgan suffered some snags early on after he became president (replacing Kassar in late Summer of '83), by early/mid 1984 he was making tremendous progress in reorganizing Atari into a lean and clean company that would be able to come back from its mounting debt and become a major player once again. However, the sloppiness of Warner's split ruined that and left TTL/Atari Corp with a chaotic mess to clean up that had been created by the split. (ie NOT the same mess that Morgan had already been working on correcting since late '83 -that mess had been on the verge of being cleaned up, but Warner made a new one with their sloppy management of the transition of assets to Atari Corp -among other things it put Atari Corp and Atari Games at odds with eachother and put the 7800/GCC deal in conflict) But again, the 5200 was one among many (some much bigger) problems at Atari Inc and one of the various symptoms that finally made those problems obvious to the public. Hell, the 5200's lack of compatibility wouldn't have been that bad of an ideas if it meant a cleaner, sleeker, more efficient design, and indeed, the cuts made from the A8 design should have allowed some pretty decent cost reduction and consolidation, but that didn't happen. (overbuild, oversized case making a machine larger and heavier than the A400's 4+ board design with bulky aluminum castings and a motherboard larger than the 1200XL when it should have been smaller than the 600 prototype -the controllers were also an odd mix of cut corners and missed cost reduction, etc, etc) Sticking with the 3200 would have made plenty of sense though, even at the expense of a delayed release. (it had been in development since 1980 at least, but apparently management was worried that it wouldn't be ready soon enough and it was dropped in favor of the accelerated 5200 design -though they probably could have pushed a quick-fix 3200 via TIA+GTIA rather than STIA and still managed to make it significantly cheaper than the 5200 -basically a 7800 with ANTIC+GTIA instead of MARIA) Once again, hindsight is 20-20. On one hand, you could argue that it cost the lucrative console market that emerged later on from one that was DEAD in 1984. On the other, you might argue that Atari might not have made it to 1986 to even try competing in that market. Well, not really dead, but weakened, and Tramiel had every intention of pushing video games (out of necessity if nothing else), but the mess created by Warner's management of the split really hindered that and also killed a lot of Morgan's plans. (Morgan's ongoing developments could have been adjusted to match Tramiel's if not already meshing reasonably well, but the mess prevented any such transition -let alone the potential to drop the RGB/ST in the preliminary design phase and jump on one of Atari Inc's fully prototyped 16-bit chipsets) Atari Corp was put in a bad situation with that mess from the split and also had next to no funds to allocate for anything else, so "just paying GCC" was not an attractive prospect. Again, you could even argue that that conflict could have favored dropping the 7800 altogether in favor of a number of alternatives. (pushing the 600 as a game console or a direct derivative of that like an XLGS -maybe slap in a membrane keyboard to cut cost since it was going to primarily be a game system -though the more changes made, the more R&D overhead to deal with) That or they could have stuck with the 5200 and corrected its flaws. (again, it had potential to be a pretty low-cost system, much more than the modest tweak of the 5100/Jr, and the controllers could have been addressed as well -short of the revised spring loaded POT module, they could/should have offered plain "digital" versions using pull-up resistors to provide 8 analog directions in leu of pots -that would be both cheaper and more reliable and would work better for all games save those intended for precision analog specifically -some of those would have been better with paddles but a few would be best with the full analog sticks -by 1984, the POT module would probably have been the way to go though) However, the 5200 was really off the table by that point due to the formal discontinuation by Atari Inc in May of 1984, so they'd have had a hard time doing a 180 on that. Also, the 7800 had already started to be hyped, produced in limited quantities (with some 5,000 completed units stockpiled components for more) with a small test market and press release about the same time as CES iirc, so a lot of incentive to continue with the 7800 plans as well. (ie lots of trade-offs with any of the options, though the XLGS -or plain 600XL- option could have been a bit foolproof: being directly compatible with the computer line which was continually supported, and could displace the 7800 if that fell through or be kept in parallel with the 7800 as the entry level "game computer" as such) The mess of the split would have convoluted any possibilities for the time, but in hindsight, pushing a stop-game game computer (ie a modified 600XL with cheap membrane/cheap keyboard and console pricing, or just a plain 600XL with a gaming bundle -maybe switch to the cheap keyboard later). That would have been even more foolproof in the wake of the crash with dedicated video game consoles becoming less attractive for retailers for a time (more so in some regions than others) and would bolster support for A8 games as well -and a ton of stockpiled hardware+components and software for the computer line. (plus, in spite of the chaos and loss of most/all of the console game programmers, most of the computer programming staff had been retained at Atari Corp, so they had more resources there -though funding would still be tight in general) And "doing the 5200 right" the the XEGS may not have been a bad idea, but doing so in 1987 vs '84/85 was made it more of a bad idea. Hell, but 1987, the 65XE was approaching the 7800's price point, so a 16k machine (let alone with an even low cost form factor -but perhaps more convenient front mounted joyports and top mounted cart slot) might have matched the 7800's price by that point. Of course, you could also argue the 5200 itself could have been scrapped in favor of the 600 back in '82, or an even more cost-cut version of the 600 (like retaining the cheap 400 keyboard or similar -preferably in addition to a "full" 600 model on top of the cheaper game-console version), again more like the XEGS but far earlier. (the 5200 could have been cheaper still, but that didn't happen, and a cheap console-oriented computer could have cut into the computer price war as well, but possibly held up favorably against the competition) They could have even removed the keyboard entirely, retained only the function keys needed by most cart games, and added a keyboard port like the XEGS. (perhaps stripping out BASIC in that case) The 3200 would have been nice, but if they were going for a more direct hack of the A8, why not make it fully compatible? (especially since the 5200 lacked lockout anyway) Hell, they'd be replacing the 400 in its originally intended "console with a keyboard" role (more or less), but actually being cheap enough to compete as a game console in the lower-end price bracket. (possibly even undercutting the colecovision -in-house chipset mixed with lower cost licensed/3rd party components and only 16k DRAM without any added SRAM and a single, unified bus -more so if they pushed for using 2 16kx4-bit DRAM chips vs 8 16kx1-bit DRAM chips -8kB density vs 2 kB) Or like with Tramiel later on, they could have used the lower-end "computer game system" as a stop-gap until the 3200 was ready (with the computer-console also doing dual-duty as a major competitor in the highly competitive low-end computer market), but doing so for engineering delays rather than the conflicting contract with Warner/GCC in Tramiel's case. In all of those examples, CGIA would have come into play as well. (except CGIA seemed to get lost in the transition to Atari Corp unfortunately) Agreed. But what I wrote and postulated on was the two companies sharing the platform instead of spending a ton of money battling each other in the courts over it. Even in 1987ish when the two companies finally settled their legal cases, they should've agreed to combine the platforms together. After all, IBM and Apple later decided to try something similar with Taligent, not that that came to much fruition. My point is had the ST and Amiga become a single platform, the combined user base would have been sufficient to keep it going and we might have a viable 3rd platform today in competition with Windows and Mac OS X. [and no, I'm not considering Linux]. The rivalry between Jack Tramiel and Irving Gould made that impossible and the computer industry today is poorer because of it. What you're suggesting could also be considered collusion, and may have resulted in anti-trust suits or other legal action. Again, the lack of cooperation was a totally separate issue from the weaker management/marketing at CBM (unless you're suggesting that Jack at Atari Corp would have an influence at CBM again), and also has nothing to do with the lack of licensing the chipsets to expand the platforms as market-wide standards. (or other mistakes/missed opportunities from limiting expansion -especially on the ST, to slow/poor evolutionary design, to Sam Tramiel's weak management from '89 onward, etc) I'm not sure of the context, and Curt and Marty are still digging more up, but: at one point Marty did mention that some staff (possibly management, maybe Morgan -I forget) had attempted to get Tramiel to look over the existing projects, but that didn't work out for whatever reason, probably a mix of tunnel vision on the RBP/ST, trying to clean up the mess Warner created with the transition, and general lack of coordination also resulting from the split. (they might have even retained many of the necessary documents and perhaps prototypes, but by the time they really were looked over, the design teams were long gone and/or the hardware was difficult to mate to the established ST architecture in a cost-effective manner) Not just the software either, but there was the UNIX OS+GUI in development as well. (again, I'm not sure of the context, but Atarimuseum should eventually get a comprehensive update on the subject -and an even more complete story behind the hardware and events in the final books; there was supposed to be such an update months ago, but it got delayed) I know that the existing designs had been configured as high-end workstations in '83, but that doesn't mean the chipsets themselves were fundamentally limited to such. (the dual or triple 68000s and massive 2 MB of RAM shown in some specs/schematics demonstrate obvious areas for cost cutting totally independent of the chipsets) I actually doubt that the chipsets (or at least the simplest of the 2 or 3 systems created) couldn't have been reworked for a lower-cost consumer level machine. (whether that would involve modifying the custom chips or simply implementing them in a more conservative manner would be another issue though -or even leaving some of the chips out of the final designs -the very fast that at least one of the chipsets was being looked at with game console potential -may have been RAINBOW- hints at the existing chips being cost effective as such) The super-high-end configuration of the prototype specs is hardly surprising for the environment they were developed in at ATG There's got to be more to it and I hope the full story behind that eventually comes out. (if anything, pushing for renegotiation with some royalties for Atari Corp might have been attractive) I doubt it had to do with the STe though, there were off the shelf alternatives that were cheaper in design and in large scale production by that point (so even without the IP, the economies of scale would push big time), namely Yamaha's various FM synth chips including the YM2203 which was fully backwards compatible with the YM2149 but added 3 4-operator FM synthesis voices (ie YM2151/YM2612 quality FM channels) with a footprint identical to the YM2149 save for an external (tiny) 8-pin DIP serial DAC. (it had also been in production some 4 years by the time the STe was released -and they probably should have added it to at least higher-end ST models from '86 onward) AMY was a synth chip (albeit with some characteristics that allowed interesting voice/speech synth) and not a PCM/sample playback device as such anyway, so not something to displace the DMA sound in the STe, but supplement it. (but IMO, the YM2203+STe DMA sound would have been great for the time, better than the Amiga for a lot of stuff -more hardware voices, and hardware synth meaning less RAM allocated to samples -or higher quality samples for the PCM instruments and SFX that were used) A shame no system was released earlier on with those original controllers, thus allowing an evolutionary period by the time 6 buttons were really needed. (the Panther was weak as it was, but there were tons of other opportunities -and the controller port/interface design was from the 1989 STe after all -STe/TT/etc derivatives, Lynx derivatives, a quicker redesign of the Panther allowing better bus sharing and DRAM rather than SRAM, licensing the Slipstream ASIC from Flare, etc) Of course, Sam had made tons of other mistakes prior to that (on the consoles, Lynx, and computers), so less than ideal controllers were really insignificant by comparison. (not having any 4th gen home console was among those many mistakes) So a lot of this postulation is interesting, but a bit redundant when the biggest what-if would be if Jack had stayed into the early 90s alongside Katz or someone as capable as Katz running the entertainment division. (or even pushing to bring Katz back on board after he left Sega at the end of 1990 -might have been early '91) As it was, according to: http://mcurrent.name/atarihistory/interactive.html Katz left in February of '89, replaced by Mead Ames-Klein who handled dual duties as head of Atari Computer and Entertainment (but that article claims he came in early 1990, but that's odd since Katz had left in early '89) Elie Kenan came in to replace Klein in July of 1990 Larry Siegel became the president of the Entertainment division in fall of 1990 (so again having a distinct president of that division) Bernie Stolar replaced Siegel in summer of 1992 (the same Stolar who would later join Sony of America and later Sega of America), he left that October (apparently from then on, there was no formal head of Atari Entertainment) I wonder if he was disappointed (or frustrated) by how Commodore ended up getting driven into the ground by weaker management after he left. (let alone to see the same thing happen to Atari Corp under the watch of his own son . . . though that's more of a give for disappointment) I've seen a few examples of Tramiel recounting his departure from CBM and he didn't seem so much bitter as disappointed. (though in some cases he was also probably influenced by being a public spectacle as below) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NImJFV3wH88 (it's towards the very end at 9:25 -also interesting that they're still referring to the 130ST when that was just the demonstration unit and there's no mention of the 260ST at all)

Oops, my mistake. I bought this in 1982, not 92. It's probably not a date code. Sorry about the confusion. It is, the "292" means it was manufactured in the 29th week of 1982. It CAN'T be - I bought it before the 29th week of 1982. Hard to sell a computer that's not even made yet. When I said "summer", I meant it from a student's point of view. It was purchased the first week of June. Maybe it's using the Fiscal calendar. (starting on October 1st of the preceding calendar year) Thus the 29th week of the 1982 fiscal year would have been the 3rd week of April. That would also explain how the 3 digit code could be applied to 1979 models as well, assuming the A8 launched in October or later (not sure on the exact date), otherwise the third digit would have had to be 0 for '79, 1 for '80, 2 for '81, and 3 for '82. (if the Fiscal year was used and the A8 launched in the 1980 fiscal year, 0 would be 1980, 1 '81, and 2 '82)

Hmm, another thing is that any interrupt driven effects would be impossible on the 7800. (no IRQ on the cart slot and not even RIOT interrupts -which would also be useless for any effects needing interrupts synced to POKEY's timers but useful for other things -including TIA hacks) Plus, the 7800's DMA set-up could create situations where you wouldn't have reliable interrupts. (ie a lot of missed/delayed responses to IRQ -or you could make sure MARIA left enough DMA time for the CPU in active display) I don't think that's ever an issue on the A8/5200 since ANTIC/GTIA can't saturate the bus like that.

IIRC, I read somewhere (old magazine) that Atari was planning to use a successor of YM2149 (seems to be the YM2203) but it didn't make it in the ST because the chip wasn't available at the ST launch date. Can someone confirm this? Robert I believe the YM2203 was launched in 1985 close to the time the YM2151 did, though preproduction samples probably would have been available earlier (for various potential buyers to test), however the initial quantities may have been limited and Yamaha had several other buyers: there were several arcade companies using it (including Sega and Capcom), but more so, NEC likely would have had priority for the new models of the PC-8801 adding the YM2203. (possibly the new PC-9801 as well) So that would have left it as a later option, but Atari didn't push for that either it seems. (making it standard on the 1040 and MEGA might have made sense, or retroactive across the board for all ST models -again, better if expansion provisions were made and there were several other features -like scrolling and DMA sound- that also could/should have been addressed fairly early on to promote support as standard features -simple scrolling would have been faster/simpler/cheaper to add than a full blitter and could have been embedded into the SHIFTER while a simple DMA sound channel also should have been relatively simple to add much sooner than the STe -especially a simple fixed/limited frequency mono channel, though pushed to 48-50 kHz like the STe or Tandy-1000 would have been nice, especially for multiplex/interleave mixing) So a scrolless shifter and plain YM2149 could have been stop-gaps for early models. (a bare 8-bit DAC port would also be a nice stop gap for software samples sound prior to DMA -mainly for demos and deciated speech/music programs though, or low sample rate in-game stuff) There was also the AY-3-8930 with hardware variable duty cycle pulse wave and 3 envelopes (so closer to the SID, but without filtering or ring modulation -and having to use the envelope to hack low res saw or triangle waves). The YM2203 also didn't support those features, so it wouldn't have been a clean upgrade as it could be for the YM2149 or plan AY-3-8910/12/13. Why should this be a problem? When joining 16 bit, both channels play sounds depending on the other voices setting. Then you could set the wanted channel to volume only and use it for digitals. OK, but you wouldn't be using POKEY interrupts to drive those PCM channels. (you could use external interrupts or cycle timed loops though -the latter being difficult to implement in-game though) And, again, that really doesn't change things a whole lot from what the AY already offers in the ST, at least for the PCM side of things. (and anything in-game would be very limited as it is now -especially anything interrupt driven) Yes, POKEY is more flexible in some areas, but they both have trade-offs. In any case, it's a bit moot since Atari should have aimed at at least having rudimentary DMA sound like the MAC but perhaps at a higher sample rate (with or without an additional PSG), and that would have likely been cheaper in the long run too, if they removed the PSG at least -they could cut the YM and one of the ACIAs in favor of a VIA or CIA -and have a few "bonus" I/O lines from those chips. (it could have meant a delay in the release of the ST though, same with adding scrolling registers to the SHIFTER -both things should have been relatively simple and inexpensive to add, but there probably would have been a trade-off in development time and release date . . . albeit they could have included better provisions for expansion from the start and added those simple -but very important- features by '86 if not late '85 with relatively easy drop-in replacements for early models -maybe have a direct write DAC port in the early models and an added DMA chip added when it was complete) An FM synth chip would have been nice, but they'd just become available in '85 and would be in limited supply as well as less favorable price wise. (if they did keep the YM2149, the 2203 would have been a very nice replacement later on) The Amy comment was on the issue of adding the POKEY channels together, more of a rough analogy though. (just additive synthesis) How is that similar to the YM3812/OPL2? Do you mean in the way the additional (non sine) base/single operator waveforms are created? (aside from 2-op additive or FM synth) That's something unique to the OPL2 and OPL3 (and OPLL) with all other Yamaha FM synths using pure sine waves. (including the original YM3526 OPL) I don't think it was very often used for Adlib stuff, or OPL3 stuff for that matter. (at least I've gotten that impression) Do you mean analog as in analog synthesis sounding? (digital synth like Yamaha FM can sometimes have that sound a bit too -especially if trying to emulate analog synth sounds, but I've come to associate the more distinct nature of digital FM separately -the general crisp sound from FM synth -aside from implementations that low pass filter the crap out of it- is one of the distinctive differences -albeit that's more tied to analog synth often using heavy filtering, and without that it would be more like simpler chips sound -pure square/triangle/saw/pulse with or without ADSR) It's interesting that most POKEY chiptunes seem to avoid using those tricks. I think I've heard a few using sawtooth stuff, but mainly square/noise/periodic pulse/noise and software pulse modulation. (the AY's saw hack seems to get used much more often -though PWM is rather rare by comparison) I'm not actually sure this is using saw, but it sounds like it might: http://battleofthebits.org/arena/Entry/pokey+mann/3639/ (pulse waves of certain duty cycles can sound a bit like saw -especially at low frequencies) And that's not using any interrupts, right? (vs software modulation -very technically possible on the ST, but impractical for most games) Of course it uses interrupts. The Pokey PCM / sampling features will not run by themselves, as Pokey doesn't have active DMA control. So, we already need an interrupt scheme, as in the classical case we also do 4-bit PCM sampling by using an interrupt (or fixed timing scheme). Doing some extra sawtooth modulation (also by interrupt/timing scheme) on top will help us getting a finer audio level control. Let's say, effectively 8 or 9 bit. And high speed interrupts will kill the ST, that's why you see very limited in-game PCM and little to no software modulation. You don't need an interrupt scheme either, it could be done all with cycle timed code, but that's tougher to manage outside of demos (the Apple II, CoCo, and Speccy had to do it though -and the Master System, among others). The Z80 in the Genesis has to do it that way too, but that doesn't have to heavily multitask either (only simple sound register updates, if that), and you wouldn't want to use interrupts anyway as they eat up CPU time like crazy compared to good cycle counted code. (interrupts would be OK for lower rate stuff, but not anything advanced like >16 kHz playback along with sound management, let alone scaling notes for multi-channels stuff or software decompression) The 3 channel digital tracker on the Spectrum 48k should be all software timed code, and I'd expect the better software MOD players on the ST to be the same. (or A8 for that matter, though the gain isn't nearly as dramatic as other platforms due to the fast 650x interrupts -plus you'd only get 3 channels via interrupts anyway) This topic has already come up a few times, and also popped up over at Sega-16. http://www.sega-16.com/forum/showthread.php?p=276570#post276570 http://www.sega-16.com/forum/showthread.php?p=276847#post276847 http://www.sega-16.com/forum/showthread.php?p=277067#post277067 http://www.sega-16.com/forum/showthread.php?p=277537#post277537

Actually, if you watch the Computer History Museum's video of the 25th anniversary of the Commodore 64, you would see Al Alcorn stand up and segway into related topics about what happened at Atari at the time. Al clearly states that he tried to convince the Warner brass to sign off on purchasing MOS for Atari but Warner management wouldn't agree to it. That was obviously before Commodore stepped in and took that company over. In '76, I think that would have been a bit iffy with Warner having just invested in Atari Inc (and furthering investment capital for AInc beyond the purchase). They also wouldn't have had the leverage CBM had and may have thus lost it anyway. (the interval between the Warner acquisition of Atari and CBM buyout of MOS was pretty small) Yes, whether or not it was deliberate, CBM certainly took advantage of the situation. (from what I understand, it also had to do with oversaturation of the calculator market) Yeah, I started poking around on that issue after I realized how much sense it could have made for Atari to partner with Synertek. (given they were one of Atari's prime second sources for MOS chips as well as custom ICs) I didn't find a ton of info, but some interesting stuff at least. (wiki and the sources listed on that page, plus a few other online articles -mostly pertaining to Atari) It's interesting to note that they were actually a younger company than Atari Inc. (founded in 1973) Commodore had a lot of clout too though, they were also in the computer market first (one of the first -non kit- home computers on the market with the PET, TRS-80, and Apple II in '77 -in fact, you could argue that CBM screwed up a bit with the PET's market sector -ie they had the opportunity to continue pushing that line or similar in the same sector against Apple -among others- while also expanding into the lower-end consumer market; Tandy sort of fell victim to the same thing with the way they moved forward from the model 1 and model 2 -they also had the mistake of exclusively distributing through Radio Shack stores, something that crippled the CoCo and Tandy 1000 as well -in spite of the latter arguably being the best valued PC clone on the market in the mid 80s, granted IBM's PCJr could have been much better if more like the Tandy-1000 derived from it). Atari was notable on the market in the mid 70s, but still relatively small (Arcades and Pong consoles mainly), and Atari Inc grew in parallel with CBM. Commodore still had some stake in the calculator business too in the late 70s, though they were rather quickly shifting over to computers and other electronics. Owning MOS also mean they could profit as a 3rd party chip vendor in addition to more rapidly expanding their consumer/business products. And while Atari could have taken advantage of several opportunities they missed like earlier unification of operations, pushing for an in-house chip vendor (if not Synertek, perhaps something else, but that's really the obvious choice), pushing the computers more early on (perhaps making the 800 a monitor-only design like the Apple II or some others that avoided FCC regs -since it was the higher end "real" computer, that would have made more sense and thus allowed a single board design with no shielding -retaining the intended apple II like expansion slots and parallel port on the 800 also would have been great, or more like the PBI with an external expansion box -the Apple II type expansion was cut for cost reasons -tying in to TV compatibility- and more so due to Kassar's vision of an appliance computer) among various other things on the console and computer side of things. (like a bottom end entry level computer directly hacked from the VCS with a full 6502 -maybe support for RIOT interrupts- and more RAM -probably DRAM with plans to later implement a consolidated DRAM interface ASIC, a 400 type keyboard -but software scanned and maybe using RIOT+TIA I/O alone -and a mechanism for reconfiguring I/O lines for different modes or possibly leaving them redundant and make sure not to use joysticks and keys simultaneously -or even support external keyboards via the joyports, and built-in cassette interface -software decoded, unlike the A8- and directly VCS compatible -possibly have the display driven with a program in a BIOS ROM sort of like the ZX-80/81 but catering to the hacks needed for TIA; something like that could have catered very well to the EU market and possibly the Japanese market as well, not to mention cutting into the bottom-end computer market in the US against the VIC and Timex machines but with the added advantage of VCS compatibility and support from Atari among other things -almost certainly being much cheaper than the VIC though possibly not as cheap as the Timex/sinclair machines) However, CBM also had things they could have done to compete better: they could have pressed on with the PET line with full backwards compatibility and the color PET (with added sound hardware) plan and expanded the PET line into a broader range of lower/mid to high end range computers (and make them more modular with some expansion support -rather than deliberately preventing RAM expansion). That, and the VIC-20 hardware could have been pressed into the video game console market in an even more cut down form factor. (and later on the C64 chipset could have been pressed into that role as well in the mid '80s, perhaps something like the MAX configuration but stripping it of all computer I/O logic and shrinking the board -plus adding a top mounted cart slot with incompatible pinout and lockout of some sort) Expanding into the console market would have complicated the "why just buy a video game" marketing campaign, but well managed marketing should have pulled through with that too. (or they could avoid that more and skip straight to the C64 based console a little later) But of course, those issues were relatively small due to the success they manged to pull off otherwise (Atari's mistakes were much more serious), until Tramiel left at least.

Nintendo pulled it off, and they didn't enter the game with billions in cash, either. Atari spent a great deal of money (and time) designing, building and marketing the STs. Had they instead just pushed a fixed 5200 out the door (the design for which already existed, including better sticks), I think they would have maintained their dominant market position in consoles straight thru the crash and there wouldn't have been so much of a vacuum for Nintendo to exploit by '86. Nintendo had a LOT of advantages though: They did have some good funding by '86, they had established software support, they had a very strong position in Japan and had locked up most Japanese arcade licenses, etc, etc. Atari Inc (or Atari Corp with a proper transition) would have been in a far more favorable position, but that's not how things played out. Stop it with the 5200 stuff, the 5200 had already been dropped by the time the Tramiels were on the scene, so that was a non issue. In fact, if that hadn't been the case and the 7800 hadn't entered production and gotten hyped, it may have been attractive to drop the 7800 entirely (due to Warner's mess) and press on with a cost reduced 5200 along with the Jr. (the 5200 Jr/5100 was the tip of the ice berg as even the original hardware could have been much more consolidated, but consolidation of the older hardware itself would push that even further -CGIA would have been a big part of that if they could get it into production, though there was a pretty big back stock of A8 chips to work with as it was) OTOH, with the 5200 out of the picture and 7800 a bit of a mess: they still might have pushed for something else, like the XEGS (ie a directly compatible A8 derivative, but perhaps with 16 or 32k rather than 48/64 -32k might have been nice, especially since that would mean zero wasted RAM for cart games -carts map into the final 16k block of space that is also used by the normal 48k, so a 48k 800 only has 32k useful for 16+ kB carts -but 16k would be OK too, and they could have provided RAM expansion support too). Hell, they could probably have directly hacked the 600 or 800XL into a console form factor case plus a port for an external keyboard. (or maybe a low-cost membrane keyboard) In hindsight, that might have made more sense than the 7800 due to it also facilitating fewer distinct platforms and an established architecture for programmers to work with -and also promote support for the full A8 line as well. (one issue would be continued lack of lockout, but given the lack of 3rd party support the 7800 got, unlicensed 3rd party games would be more of a blessing than a curse ) Hmm, actually it may have been a good idea to keep console and computer designs fairly parallel, though probably more separate than above. The ST was obviously a clear break from the A8 line, so an ST derived console would be incompatible with the 8-bit consoles/computers in the practical sense, but unlike the above case (XEGS-like), they probably shouldn't have pushed any other consoles that were direct computer conversions for cost/market model reasons. (again, if pushing the 5200 had still been a good option in the wake of the Warner split mess, I'd put that over the XEGS since it had an established place on the market and was fundamentally cheaper than the A8 -or it could/should have been) So they could start with an STe based system (with tweaks to cut out all unnecessary hardware as well as boosting some capabilities to make it more favorable as a console -dual playfields and an FM synth chip probably would have done it, albeit the STe itself could have used such a boost), and going forward from that they could push parallel designs drawing off the computer and console developments in turn to reduce R&D cost overhead as well as facilitate cross development and backwards compatibility. (folding the Jaguar chipset into the ST line could have been pretty awesome for the mid '90s -and a healthier, better funded Atari would have meant a healthier Jaguar as well -fewer bugs, less conservative/more balanced design, less rushed, better support, better marketing, etc, etc) No, that was important too: Atari Corp had pretty much zero money to spare, so it WAS a big issue, plus the 7800 fumble was only one of the main problems Warner caused by the sloppy transition. Those problems (many more than the 7800 deal) took months to smooth over before normal operations could resume completely. You could just as easily argue that Warner was foolish for not backing down and paying GCC themselves.

I haven't seen comprehensive market share figures (reliable ones at least), but I'd gotten the impression that th eST never had a huge market share in the US, except maybe if you segmented the market into 16-bit computers (Mac, ST, Amiga, PC) specifically. (otherwise you've got the 8-bits flooding the market with the PC clones growing rapidly and taking over the market by the time the 8-bits are in heavy decline) In Europe, it was another story entirely: the ST dominated the 16-bit computer market up to the late 80s when the Amiga started to take the lead. (the '88 price shift was a major issue with the Amiga 500 dropping to 400 pounds in the UK -similar in others- and the 520 ST being forced from 300 to 400 due to DRAM price/supply issues) Sam taking over had a major impact as well and management issues at Atari Corp and CBM led to both computer lines failing in the early 90s and CBM goign bankrupt. Albeit, even with strong management/support of the ST or Amiga, PC clones would arrive in force sooner or later and dominate the US well before that (the fact that Amstrad dropped their lower-end PC line in '88 delayed that a good deal too), but establishing a licensed standard with either machine could have changed the game considerably for Atari or CBM. (better expandability and more timely evolution to both systems would also have been critical issues aside from marketing and business management) Maybe if the A8 had been managed better earlier on and gotten really big (more like the C64), but as it was, letting it die made more sense. (if they hadn't had so much back stock, dropping it earlier on might have even been attractive) The Plus/4 was a mistake, but something more like the C65 might have been a good idea. (the C128 was tangent to that unfortunately: an efficient, fully evolutionary design would have been better, like a VIC-III with higher res modes and a larger palette -maybe true bitmap modes, and perhaps higher color depth modes as well, dual SID, faster 6502, etc, etc -instead of CP/M and the wasteful Z80, investing in a more powerful in-house OS for the 6502 would have been better) You could argue the C64 should have been VIC compatible, but one major issue with that is the use of SRAM on the VIC. (it was not really a good long-term option to support, and using DRAM in VIC modes might have had significant compatibility issues -plus the VIC was more of a stop-gap design anyway, and it could have held the C64 back) Their management of the Amiga was a mess too though. Wasn't going to happen. The contract was dead before Atari Inc was even split (a bit of a fudge on Atari's side since they shouldn't have accepted Amiga's check). A much more interesting premise is if Atari had moved on with its own advanced computer designs (several of which were more impressive than the Amiga) and sued Amiga for breech of contract on top of that. The plan had been to have the Amiga based console out in late '84, a minimal computer (128k) in '85, and an unlimited full computer in '86, but after that fell through, the in-house options would have been the obvious alternative. (a shame the Amiga runaround delayed a definitive push for the in-house 16-bit designs) That very well may have happened after the fact had Morgan's plans continued. (Atari Inc may have already been looking into the Rainbow design as a game console and lower-cost next generation computer, but that all fell apart in the wake of the mess created by Warner's management of the split) A proper transition to Atari Corp may have pushed Tramiel to favor a derivative of one of Atari Inc's existing (fully prototyped) 16-bit designs as well as the UNIX based OS and "Snowcap" GUI they'd been developing. Hell, a favorable relationship with Atari Games could have meant licensing the new computer hardware for use in the arcade. (which would also mean arcade perfect home versions ) That, and the other "what if" is if Tramiel had stayed at CBM and managed the Amiga (and continued the C64 and such) rather than what happened after he left. (it's likely that CBM would still have picked up the Amiga -the main reason Jack hadn't on his own with TTL was a lack of funds to buy out the entire company on top of establishing the necessary manufacturing/distribution/etc -ie the things Atari Inc brought) No, that's a totally different context. It's all been explained above though: there were mistakes, but mainly made by Warner or again after Jack left. (the Sam Tramiel years) That was a mistake too and probably due mostly to Sam Tramiel's weak management. There's absolutely no reason Atari should have pushed computered: Warner hadn't pushed them hard enough, but Atari Corp managed exceptional success with the ST in the late 80s (especially in Europe) which brought the company out of debt and made it onto the fortune 500 list. (with help from the millions of 2600s and 7800s sold in the late 80s under Michael Katz' tactful management under a tight budget) Things went south just around the time Atari Corp had enough money to really push things on the market in the US. Had they played their cards right with a decent 4th gen console released in '89-91 (the sooner, the better) as well as good management of the computers, they might still be here today. (by the late 80s, the best they could hope for in the US with the ST was a niche market, but Europe had real potential for them in the mainstream for years to come -and consoles had great potential in both markets with the right marketing -remember Atari had maintained a significant lead over Sega in US market share up to '89 at least, and they had a lot more funding to work with by that point -and Europe lacked the Nontendo blockade) Of course I can, because it's perfectly true. The ST never had more than a couple percent market share. It was insignificant. Financially it was even more insignificant, because most of the units Atari did sell, they sold cheap and at low margins. By the end of the '80s Apple was moving more units of their Macintosh, and at far higher prices (and higher margins). And Apple's market share was puny compared to that of the clones. It was the dominant 16-bit computer of the 80s in Europe, with the Amiga only coming into its own at the very end of the decade. (had Atari managed things better, they could have stayed on top too -then again, CBM could have been managed far better as well) As for the ST in the US, I haven't seen any figures that really show things one way or the other in a reliable manner, but it appears that from '85-87 the ST did have a pretty significant presence on the US market, but not a massive one. (a large part of that was the C64's continued sales, though PC clones were expanding fast) CBM screwed up much worse with the Amiga since they had the clout to push it with massive advertising and offered a lower end (ie A500) form factor from the start. Atari had to make do with limited funds initially, and later on they had shortages from the surge in European demand and the decline in management later on. They also were getting into the PC clone market, but that seems to have fallen apart under Sam as well. (by the time Atari had the money to really push the ST in the US, it's best chance was digging into a niche -European support would have bolstered that too, but Atari might have done OK as a PC clone manufacturer) It did in Europe. But, again, the main issue in the US was lack of marketing due to limited funds. And no, Tramiel wasn't out to kill the competition, his main incentives were to counter the threat of the Japanese in the computer market (albeit the C64 and PC clones pretty much made that moot -at least in the US) and also to leave a legacy for his sons, which he did in late 1988. (Sam transitioned in in '87/88 and Jack retired towards the end of '88, in hindsight that was a mistake given Sam's apparent incompetence and lack of drive compared to his father) Where are you getting your figures from? Even if the game was ready in time, production can always have other delays. Yes, and that also shows that Apple missed a lot of major opportunities: The Apple II had potential for being a dominant mass market standard but they: -didn't push for a cost reduced model for the low/mid-range market with a tighter profit margin (in spite of the simplistic design having incredible potential for such -it could have been more like the Spectrum in Europe except with a huge head start and much greater respect in the higher-end market) -didn't have timely evolution of the system (2 MHz models and the higher-res graphics should have come sooner, let alone a more comprehensive update to the audio and video systems like a proper 16 color bitmap mode of reasonable resolutions and at least some form of hardware sound generation or a bare DAC along with programmable interval timer(s) to aid with CPU driven audio -perhaps upgrade that to DMA sound later on like the Mac) For the latter side of things, the evolutionary developments could eventually have led into the IIGS, but probably better in some areas and maybe slightly later. (prior to that they could have had better enhancements to the pure 8-bit side of things with gradual upgrades with faster CPUs, graphics, sound, OS, etc, and could have pushed a good GUI on the 8-bit line as well) Yes, and that could have been their definitive niche in the US market as well: music. (something to cling to even after PCs have flooded the market) In Europe they had potential for much more in the long run, as did CBM, but both fell apart.

Those were the least of Atari Inc's problems. They (like ET, Pac Man, and some less obvious issues) were SYMPTOMS of the fundamental underlying problems of management issues. Those issues didn't get addressed until after James Morgan replaced Kassar in mid 1983, but by early/mid '84 he was making considerable progress. He knew of Warner's plans to sell Atari, and that wasn't a real problem (Morgan's reorganization efforts should have continued uber new ownership as such), but Warner threw a curve ball with the decision to split up and liquidate Atari Inc rather than sell it: none of the attempts at a complete sale had been successful and Warner made the decision to split the company rather abbruptly. Even then, the main issue was that Warner delegated the split in an extremely sloppy manner: not only not notifying Atari staff (or even senior management -including Morgan) of the split (bringing Morgan in at the last minute to sign things over), but Warner also did so with almost no organization or clear definition of what Tramiel would actually be buying, and no proper transition from Atari Inc consumer to Atari Corp. It was an utter mess. It's a shame Morgan (or similar) hadn't been brought in by mid '82, or better, of Warner had had someone better than Kassar from the start. (he at leas had added much better business sense than Bushnell had ever had, but he was not experienced or well suited to running a company like Atari -his husiness had been in textiles iirc, and Atari needed someone with experience in consumer products, entertainment, and preferably at least a little knowledge about the electronics/computer industry -or coin-op arcade/entertinment for that matter -advisory staff and managers of the separate divisions of Atari could fill the gaps as long as the president was reasonably capable for the position overall and additional management was the same) See these posts for some rather nice summaries on the split/transition, as I posted earlier: http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__125__p__2183904#entry2183904 http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__150__p__2185725#entry2185725 http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__150__p__2185187#entry2185187 Of the problems leading up to the Crash in '83, the distribution system was almost certainly the most problematic (and was the main cause of the crash). The distribution network Atari Inc used (and similarly with some others on the market) ended up heavily inflating market demand and lead to oversatuartion of the young market. (the so-called "glut" of hardware and games) Among other things were various mistakes and missed opportunities for the computers and consoles in a variety of areas. (some of which came up in this thread earlier) On the hardware side of things, the 3200 would have been a much better design to stick with than the 5200 shortcut they used. (the computers could have been managed and marketed much better as well, and in different ways for the US and Euro markets) On the computer side of things, not releasing the 600 in 1982 was a big mistake. (waiting until '82 to get cost reduced versions of the 8-bits was a bit late as well -much more so in the Euro markets where the FCC was a non-issue -ie could have pushed for a single board design with no shielding ASAP) Less RAM if anything . . . RAM is expensive, though the 16k of the 5200 was affordable since it was DRAM (and promoted better consolidation further down the road). If they did stick with the 5200 (vs 3200 or such), the design could have been far more cost effective from the start: it should have have a much smaller motherboard (smaller than the 600 prototype, let alone 1200XL), 2 controller ports (given the A8s were chopped down to 2), sleek bot compact form factor, remove the expansion port but add more expansion signals to the cart slot, etc, etc. (they should have started with 2 8k DRAM chips too: 2k chips were still cheaper by a bit, but the board space saved and the long-term advantages would outweigh that) The 3200 concept is a much better idea in general IMO. (maybe switch to DRAM like the A8/5200 -especially if they could embed the interface logic, but otherwise it's a pretty nice concept -a better short cut than the 5200 could have been using GTIA+TIA in place of the planned STIA) Already happened with the 4 switch models followed by the "Vader." (smaller motherboards, generally cut cost, etc) There's tons more where that came from, and there's a lot of things they could have done better still than the above. The 2 joystick were fine, as was the removal of the cart slot: Asteroids was the sole game supporting 3 or 4 player simultaneous, perhaps allow an add-on for 2 more ports. (you'd have to disable the upper 16k of RAM though since the PIA's select lines were used to enable that address range I believe) Definitely remove the 2nd cart slot though . . . maybe 4 ports would have made sense if they stuck to 48k for the time being and waited a bit before going beyond that. (there were problems with the OS being compatible with some older software, and a dedicated IC for memory mapping could have been implemented to use bank switching for RAM beyond 48k -namely using the 4k "hole" that was used for nothing else -and thus also leaving the entire 10k OS ROM addressed and no wasted 2k of RAM for I/O -all XLs and the 65XE are really 62k rather than 64k, with 2k wasted -the 130 is 126k as such; using the 4k "hole" would probably be the best to avoid incompatibility as well) It certainly would have been more foolproof if the 1200/600 had literally been single board, consolidated/cost reduced versions of the 400/800 with built-in BASIC ROM and additional expansion support. (better expansion support could also have meant implementing that >48k mapper logic on expansion module -which the 4rd party mosaic board already had for the 400/800 -it was a hack that clipped onto the pins on the underside of the motherboard and mapped added DRAM in 4k banks) One of the problems of the A8 line from the start was lack of expansion support aside from RAM cards. The 600 and some 1200 prototypes included the PBI, but the final 1200XL did not (a closed box) while the 600 was stupidly canceled. Both should have been launched with PBI and immediate plans for an expansion box module (like the 1090XL) as well as simpler modules/add-osn plugging directly onto the PBI port. (Tandy's CoCo used a very similar system via the cart slot, and actually a female cart type expansion port might have been a cleaner approach: thus they could have the expansion system accept the very same cards/carts as the bare PBI port could -Tandy had a multi-cart add-on module for such) The drive thing was marketing, one of the biggest problems of the A8 line was lack of strong and consistent marketing, I believe. (at least in the US market) The A8 drives kicked the VIC/C64's ass with a nice 19.2k baud (without fast loaders) vs a piddly 2.4k baud for CBM drives. (as slower than some cassette drives, like the CoCo in double speed mode or Spectrum) But were there ever any ads promoting that feature? . . . No. Drives were pretty bulky for the time, and honestly the 1450XLD may not have been the best route to go either. A more professional looking desktop model was a good idea, and supporting built-in disk drive(s) was also nice, investing in a parallel interface would reduce cost (and increase profrmance -though the external drives weren't even close to maxing out SIO -you would avoid SIO contention issues though, especially when using a modem) so that was a good investment as well, but I think they should have pushed for desk top models sooner. (a mistake that would be repeated by Atari Corp with the ST line -they also repeated the closed-box mistake with that) They should have had a corded keyboard for desktop models too, not a built-in one. Much later, when half-height drives became common, it might have even been a good idea to have a built-in drive on the console models. (console meaning all-in-one keyboard form factor) Europe was a separate issue entirely though, and I'm not going to start that up again now. The cash bleeding came from the inflated market problems (saturation and overproduction) and related crash. They needed new management and the needed it ASAP, preferably from the start, but mid '82 was sort of the limit for avoiding catastrophe. One of the reasons for the crash was that Atari had been TOO competitive and had a virtual monopoly that dragged down the entire market: had competition been a bit healthier from the start, that might have balanced things better as well. (and perhaps reduced inflation too -if the competition had better distribution and related figures) On another note: Atari also missed out on pushing for vertical integration, ie finding a relatively small chip fab that they could buy/merge with and cut out the middle man. (accelerating development, cutting manufacturing costs, etc) I've brought this up before, but I think Synertek may have been the most immediate option for that. (Atari heavily used them for custom chips and 2nd sourcing MOS CPUs and I/O chips and they do fall into the "small" side as far as manufacturers go) Warner/Atari should have been pushing for that as soon as they had the ability to do so. (in the case of Synertek, Honeywell bought them just after 1979, so Atari would have had to act before that . . . or at least get into negotiations for such) CBM's purchase of MOS in 1976 should have spurred such to a fair degree, and Warner/Atari should have been in a reasonable position to push for such by '79. (at least enough to enter into negotiations for a merger with Synertek, or a tight partnership with provisions for a merger later on -given how dependent Synertek was on Atari's business, it would have been win win for both parties -the crash and Atari's problems -with related loss of production demand- pretty much killed Synertek and Honeywell shut them down in '85) That was part of it, but the sale/split took place after the takeover had been averted. There are 2 contributing factors for Warner still pushing for Atari's sale: 1. the attempted takeover prompted Warner to consult a firm to assess their assets and said firm suggested that Warner sell Atari Inc 2. deflecting the takeover had cost Warner dearly and they were rather desperate However, the sale of Atari was not the problem: it was Warner's execution. Ideally, the company would have been sold as a whole and continued Morgan's reorganization (and that's what Morgan was counting on), but that didn't happen. Even so, with the split, things could have worked out OK if Warner had facilitated a normal transition with everything laid out and comprehensive plans to split things cleanly and smoothly transition to Atari Games and Atari Corp (TTL with Atari consumer folded into it). As such, Morgan should still have been able to complete reorganization and maybe even stay on under Tramiel, but it was a total mess instead. Warner did not notify Atari Inc staff (including Morgan) of the change in plans with the split (Morgan was brought in at the very last minute to sign things) and Tramiel himself had been taken off guard by the proposition (he had earlier declined the full sale of Atari Inc -as had several others, but Warner contacted him out of the blue with the offer to split Atari Inc). To make things even worse: this all took place over 4th of July weekend, and hapless staff came back to total chaos in the wake of Warner's botched handling of the split. Again, Marty put it pretty eloquently: Yes, not to mention putting the have a job/don't have a job on Jack's head because it was either you're going to the new Atari Corporation or you're looking for employment elsewhere. Which when I talked to Leonard he stated how they all felt horrible about it going in. Knowing they were going to have to do that with a bulk of the Atari Inc. people. And most of the people didn't have a clue after that July 4th weekend that they were laid off because of how Warner handled it - no announcement to the employees, no nothing. They thought they were returning to work at Atari Inc. busines as usual with no idea the buildings, assets, etc. now belonged to TTL. Warner just let everything sit there and put it in Jack's lap for a transition, simply handing over the keys. Literally everything - employees, buildings, ongoing contracts, etc., etc. Which is why Jack and company had to spend the entire rest of the month of July going over what they all inherited, and who they were going to hire over. (Jack and company literally had people helping tally everthing down to the last refrigerator). People came in after that weekend only to find complete anarchy and people being called in to interviews. And now as far as they knew, Jack had taken over Atari Inc. and was now their boss because of the way Warner handled it. The first few days until Jack started locking down all the consumer buildings (including warehouses) were madness, people were driving up and loading up U-Hauls and vans full of stuff. Likewise a number of people started wiping out their directories on the mainframe. Ideally there should have been some form of normal transition - where all assets are mapped out, employees are explained the situation so they have time to start looking for jobs elsewhere, and a clear explination of how the Inc. assets are being split. As it was because of how Warner did it, Atari Corp and Atari Games were in litigation for years after arguing who owned what patents and such. -------------- That doesn't seem to have been the case though. Tramiel was not interested in getting CBM back as such, he was mainly interested in filling a hole in the market he felt the Japanese would exploit (as they had with typewriters, adding machines, and calculators -all things Jack had experienced directly) while also providing his sons with a solid legacy to take over. He did just that and stepped down in late '88 (transitioned Sam in in '87/88), and that was probably a mistake since Sam doesn't seem to have been anywhere near the businessman his father was. (plus they lost Katz at the same time, so no more of that rather exceptional management of the entertainment division -his replacements seemed rather inconsistent by comparison) And another quote from Marty: Truthfully, Leonard didn't have much to do with the daily operations, he was more involved with the products themselves. And I'm not sure that Sam would have been able to change things if he didn't have the heart attack. Every since he had taken over, the company itself was on a downward spiral. When Jack turned the company over to him, he had mananged to bring the company out of the red and in to the black - shedding all the debt they took on from Warner in the purchase. That was his dream after all, to be able to hand something solid over to his sons and retire. Sam managed to take it from a multi-division multi-product company to a single product company by the time Jack came back in. If they would have fought to the last $$$, there would have been nothing left of a legacy for his kids, hence the reverse merger to get out while they still could. Truthfully, I would rather have had Jack not retire back in the late 80's and have him stick around for the oncoming Wintel onslaught to see how he would have dealt with that. I can't picture just turning tail and closing down the computer division like that. ---------- Things hadn't been perfect under Jack, but what he managed is certainly impressive, especially after what Warner ended up doing with the split. (of course, besides what he might have done had he stayed at Atari Corp into the 90s, there's if he'd stayed at CBM ) I want GEM back. I wish the owners of DRI would create a community foundation to get GEM up and running as a viable environment so the clowns behind KDE and Gnome can be pushed to the backburner on all other *nix platforms besides OS X. And Ubuntu's colors remind me of 70s shag carpet. Utterly terrible. Then again, I didn't think DRI's GEM was as nice to look at as Atari's versions... Does that include the original pre-Apple-lawsuit GEM? Another thing to consider is what GEM would have been exactly if IBM had adopted CP/M. GEM was an independent OS from CP/M, so making it mesh with CP/M would have been a bit different. (ie a derivative running on top of CP/M and able to execute CP/M programs in shell windows) If Jack had stayed at Atari Corp, who knows what might have happened. Then again, if CBM had been managed capable (by Jack or otherwise), things on that side likely would have been even more successful in the US and Europe. (quite possibly no crap like the C-16, Plus/4, C64GS, etc, and maybe even something better than the C128, or pushing a cut-down Amiga into that role instead, let alone something more like the C65 -on the C-16 side, a 16k version of the C64 would have been a good fit . . . in fact, had they pushed a 16k model of the C64 from the start, that could have put an even bigger hurt on competition -by the time the C16 was released, it was far less necessary as the C64 had fallen towards the lower-end range already) Atari Corp didn't have the funds to pull that off, not to mention all the delays and problems forced by Warner's poor management of the split. (given what they had to work with, they managed to pull it off exceptionally well) OTOH, had Morgan's plans continued, Atari Inc very likely would have recovered much more quickly and been stronger in all their markets. Not only did they have the XL and 7800 (and 2600 Jr) to push (with the 5200 being discontinued already -but the smart move with the 7800 module to bridge 5200 users and retain better PR), but they also had various promising 16-bit chipsets and some work on a UNIX based OS and GUI. They had planned to release the Amiga based console in late '84 as well, but that fell through with Amiga cheating them (and the split taking place a couple days later), but Atari may have already been looking at their in-house designs to apply in a similar role (Marty mentioned the Rainbow chipset may have been considered). There had also been plans for a PC/DOS compatible machine (1600XL) back in '83 that got delayed along with other projects with Morgan's reorganization. (quite necessary, but there were some unfortunate snags earlier on -which, of course, wouldn't have been the case had Atari gotten the management they needed a year or so earlier) For that matter, on the PC side of things, not pushing the PC line more (in the US) was probably a mistake. Atari had a reasonable chance at breaking into the clone market, and early results were fairly promising iirc, but it fell apart later on. (perhaps another thing Sam was responsible for) No, you'd have to go back to 1976 and tell Nolan to hold out for $38 million or more for the buyout offer and/or call up Michael Milken and finance Atari Inc. through junk bonds and remain independent. Either way, you take those extra monies and buy MOS Technology thereby c-blocking Tramiel from purchasing the company and thus preventing his later price war at Commodore. Actually, Commodore may not have existed for long w/o MOS because the PET design came from Chuck Peddle [if I'm not mistaken] at MOS. You'd take the PET design and offer to trade it to Philips in order to settle the patent infringement lawsuits and for that intellectual property to be transferred to Atari. Philips later crashes and burns with the PET now known as the Odyssey 2 or 3. No, Nolan's management was terrible . . . he had rather poor business sense and did not make a very good president/CEO at all. He may have had a place at Atari Inc under Warner, but I don't think his personality (or ego) really favored such. It was Nolan's weak business skills that forced Atari into the position they were in in '77 in the first place. (strong management and smart business could have meant Atari not needed outside help at all) What needed to be done was getting someone better than Kassar (who was at least much better than Bushnell for the business side of things), and possibly not having Atari Inc as a direct subsidiary of Warner, but a distinct spin-off company. (unless Warner had been more prudent in its management as a subsidiary and avoided the foibles of dual management it suffered historically -stronger/more capable management on Atari Inc's end would have helped that too) Space Invaders was first. Another consideration was Japan: the VCS had been managed very poorly in that market by Epoch (not sure on the details, but even if not released late, it seems to have been poorly marketed and overpriced)

Digitals and software modulation is NOT going to happen in-game aside from very sparing and/or low sample rate stuff. (pulse wave basslines would work, or mid/low pitch notes, or low rate FX/drum/etc via interrupts) Same for AY though, and you only need 1 channel for digital stuff if you're doing fixed pitch playback: interleave/multiplex mixing would have basically no overhead over using multiple hardware channels. (multiple channels is what you'd want for notes without scaling) And can you really do volume modulation on 2 POKEY channels with 2 16-bit mode paired/slaved channels? (you couldn't use the timer interrupt method, but the ST has added interval timers to push that) POKEY does have flexibility over the AY, but it's all trade-offs: tons of cases where one does better than the other. by default the AY has 3 12-bit square wave channels with the ability to apply a (limited) envelope along with noise generation (mixed into any of the 3 channels -a feature that's mainly useful if stereo is used). POKEY has 4 8-bit res square wave channels (aside from additional octave control) and noise generation (including periodic pulse) on any of those channels. (both have additional hacks via the envelope or such, and more via software stuff, but high frequency interrupts are not a realistic option on the ST as they are on the A8) Not like Adlib, more like AMY or various additive synthesizers. Adlib uses FM OR additive synth: ie 2 waveforms added together (of a limited selection of waves derived from sine -most Yamaha synths used true sine only; the OPL2 and OPL3 are the exceptions), or with frequency modulation using 1 wave to modulate the other. (the latter being FAR more powerful and how a true square wave -or very close to it- could be generated from 2 sine oscillators where 4 would be needed via additive synth) Of course, FM is FAR more powerful with more operators and a variety of algorithms. (like the 4-op YM2151 of the arcade, Genesis's YM2612, or the 6-op DX-7 synthesizer -among many others) Plus additional ADSR on top of that. (and additive synthesis of the resulting per-channel waveforms by pairing channels in software -often done on various PSGs as well: harmonizing/additive synthesis) And that's not using any interrupts, right? (vs software modulation -very technically possible on the ST, but impractical for most games)

The 5200 controllers aren't as bad as some make out, but they were far from ideal. (analog was unnecessary much of the time, and plain digital -or pull up resistors wiring switches to analog lines- would have been simpler, cheaper, and more reliable) For the few games analog was needed for, they could have offered accessories. (dedicated paddles would have been nice too) The keypads were also generally unnecessary and could have been accessories to simplify the design and reduce cost. The flex circuitry ended up being unreliable, not one of the better cost trade-offs over using a PCB. (the side buttons should have been VCS type tact/dome switches, or at least rubber dome switches/chicklet buttons over sturdy PCB contacts as later gamepads and such used -something like the 7800 buttons) The Intellivision and Coleco controllers were problematic too, though the CV ones were OK for a lot of stuff at least. (best for games not using the buttons and allowing the stick to be used with your thumb) The 7800 controllers fixed some things but broke others: they were a bit too big and the joystick was too stiff and bulky. (a slightly scaled down and shortened VCS stick would have been nice -prior to the joypads at least) Some like the idea of built-in paddles a la 2700, but I really don't like joystick with bulky knobs and especially ones that turn. (full sized arcade sticks are one thing, but compact home controllers are another entirely -though I prefer arcade sticks that are locked from spinning as well) Having separate paddles and sticks is much better, and the VCS paddles were fine. (maybe have 2 buttons, but otherwise they're fine ergonomically and functionally) The 7800 beats the C64's VIC-II (and ANTIC+GTIA) in pretty much every respect capabilities wise: more and larger sprites, more color for playfield and sprites, etc, etc. The 7800 sound was bad in hindsight (intended to add only via cart expansion), but in the context of the mid 1984 release it wasn't that huge of a deal. (plus they could have used an add-on module rather than on-cart chips for a 1 time cost to consumers, though none of that ever happened) I think they probably could have crammed in a POKEY in '84 with some trade-offs, or at very least a tiny SN76489 PSG. (if they went off the shelf) But that's not what GCC ended up doing. (the easiest way to add more board space would have been to make the RF modulator external) The 7800 was designed to be extremely cost cut, so it made some sense in that context. (albeit, with the 3200 instead of the 5200 in the first place, TIA sound would have been much more acceptable, and that's if S-TIA didn't add more sound hardware -or the TIA+GTIA route, but that would add the GTIA click/beeper channel and RIOT's timer could have been useful for interrupts for CPU modulation of that 3rd channel -or the TIA channels) The resolution was fine for the time . . . though a better argument is that the 320 wide mode should have been a 256 wide mode with more color flexibility. (the 160 wide mode can push a lot more color -among other things- than the NES can per scanline or on screen, let alone the old TMS9918 VDP) The 7800 didn't get nearly enough support for it to demonstrate its full capabilities. (the 5200/A8 either -aside from some homebrew stuff, and the CV more or less through the MSX1 and SG-1000) It's a very limited expansion port (see pinouts online) and most likely was intended for a disk and/or casette interface. Just curious ... how many 7800 games have you played? In some cases, it could be hardware. In others, it could be bad programming. Animation could be a ROM limit. (trade-off between graphical detail and animation with a limited ROM size) It was one of the first games made for the 7800. And in spite of that it looks better than the NES version in some ways. (and Joust in pretty much all ways -generally better sounding too) I'd disagree about it having poor animation capabilities. Animation isn't a programming limitation, it's an art decision when ROM space is limited. (animation = ROM space) Well, on that note, the 7800 IS more powerful by a good margin. (best case on A8 with hardware+software sprites -be it bitmap or charmode stuff- will be more limited than the best case on the 7800 in every respect) 1) Pac Man Collection was made in 200X, not in 1983 so it's irrelevant to this discussion ... no one in 1983 was playing that game either. But I agree, Ed did an awesome job. As for resolution, this isn't cut and dry either. Resolution is significant, but not the end all be all. Many other things make a difference from art design to color depth. (Doom on the Jaguar runs at 160 pixels wide ) The SNES, most PCE/TG-16 games, SMS, CV/SG-1000/MSX1/etc all run at the same resolution and dot clock (ie same pixel shape), but with drastically different graphics. Were there any commercial 7800 games in high res? The limitations of those modes are generally not worth it compared to the flexibility of the 160 wide modes. (ie most common games of the period will look much better at 160 width, and again better than C64 counterparts -or A8 for that matter, and better than the NES with trade-offs -more color, more sprites without flicker, etc) I think that's an urban myth. I have never seen any stats for either the Coleco or the Atari 5200 other than the usual "I heard from someone, who heard from someone, who heard from someone" variety. I don't believe that it was "starting to win" and have never seen any NPD data to back it up. Same for the Coleco proving it "far outsold the 5200". Just a lot of questionable claims by fanboys. The 5200 might have pulled through in the long run, but the 7800 could have been better (neither would have been preferable with something other than the 5200 from the start followed by a true successor to that in the late 80s -or nothing but the VCS and computers until they got their other problems settled, or straight jump to the 7800 -but the 3200 would effectively be the same context but sooner). There's no sold sales figures for either platform though. (and again, there's no telling if the 5200 could have been as successful -or more- than the 7800 with any number of variables, though I think most would agree that sticking with the 3200 in the first place would have cut out a lot of the confusion and been better in the long run than switching things after the fact)) In any case, Atari had much bigger issues than competition at the time. The #1 problem was the internal management issues and related problems with the industry. (especially the distribution network and related inflation issues -and dual mangement conflicts on top of fundamentally problematic management) I already addressed this above though.

Yes, I know, tons of trade-offs, and in many cases cost wasn't the deciding factor either. (like various consoles using SRAM due to performance, or more often, development time -plenty of cases you could argue DRAM should have been used in hindsight -some other cases of exotic stuff like PSRAM used, though that was at least cheaper than SRAM once it became available towards the end of the 80s) It was generally a trade-off of development time/cost/complexity and actual RAM included in the system. (like with the VIC-20, though in that case, CBM had added incentive from a considerable stock of 4-bit 512 byte SRAM chips from calculators and early PET models -later models used DRAM) For early systems it was more of a cost trade-off than R&D as discrete logic was necessary (ASIC alternatives were not yet feasible, or R&D overhead was more considerable), so it was definitively a decision of less SRAM vs enough memory to merit the complexity of using DRAM. (hence why the 3200 had intended to use 2 kB of SRAM vs the 16k DRAM of the 400 and 5200 -though, in the long run DRAM may have been cheaper still due to consolidation -the TMS9918 had built-in DRAM control/refresh circuitry back in '79 I believe, but that was limited to video and thus the Colecovision used SRAM for main memory -as did the SG-1000, though the MSX and several other computer implementations didn't as provisions for more RAM was necessary) It's not so much the number of chips needed (in some cases you've got higher density DRAM chips vs lower density SRAM, but it depends on the circumstances); it's more about the manufacturing costs and volumes: SRAM takes a lot more silicon for the same capacity with similar manufacturing tech (6T SRAM vs 1T+1C DRAM), plus DRAM was standardized with multiplexed address lines vs direct addressing for SRAM (and PSRAM) and DRAM was generally produced in larger volumes for greater economies of scale. But for simple embedded stuff (especially on-cart RAM expansion for console games), it was almost always SRAM up to the mid '90s. (DRAM was used for the Super FX and SVP chips with DRAM interface circuitry embedded in the coprocessor ASICs) Take the case in point though: you've got 2k and 8k SRAM chips available in the early/mid 80s (2k only at the beginning of the 80s -and 512 byte of course). So, for a 16k cart, you could have 8 2k (16kx1-bit) SRAM chips or 2 8k (16kx4-bit) chips by the mid 80s. (by the late 80s, 32k chips could be more cost effective -hence the use in Summer and Winter games on the 7800 in spite of only 16k being addressed) At the same time you'd have 2k and 8k DRAM chips at good prices (8k getting cheaper in '82/83) and 32k getting cheap pretty soon after that (by '85). And in sheer board space (aside from component cost), 2k 1-bit SRAMs should be 18-pin DIPs and 20 pin DIPs for the 8k SRAMs (24 pin wide DIPs early on for both due to die sizes and wide DIPs not offered below 24 pins -so definitely a factor, and a prohibitive one for the 2k option), a single 32k 8-bit SRAM in the late 80s would be a 28-pin wide DIP. A 2k 1-bit DRAM chip would be a 12-pin DIP, 8k 4-bit would be a 14-pin DIP, and a later 32k 8-bit chip would be a 20-pin DIP, but in all cases you need much more added logic for address demultiplexing, refresh, etc. (so a lot of added board space and cost of discrete components without a dedicated ASIC -which is even more R&D -so not attractive for a small 3rd party company, and for Atari themselves, offering 48k upgrades at service centers could have been more attractive -unless they already did that) Anyway, it's really up to simplicity: and for such a simple product, SRAM would generally be preferable. (much simpler, very little R&D, and still reasonably affordable in the early/mid '80s -again, for users not able/willing to modify their systems for 48k; so definitely only for 400s since 800s would have cheaper DRAM boards)

And I also trimmed it down because I was more sarcastic than I really should have been. It's sort of repeating (far more simply) what Marty said earlier with spacedice. (albeit far simpler than that discussion) http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__125__p__2183904#entry2183904 http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__150__p__2185725#entry2185725 http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__150__p__2185187#entry2185187 I know it's a long thread, but if Sunspot had bothered to read through it (or skim it for the good parts at least), he'd have a lot more information on the subject rather than having to have it rehashed one again. (except for some really odd things like the 5200 vs Mac -and apparent ignorance of the A8 computers or Apple II) I also love this satirical post from a while back:

Those ideas should be rather agreeable after all the back and forth discussion with you, Crazyace, and a few others a while back. As for wanting the same types of DRAM chips: they'd almost all be pushing for the highest density chips they could get at good prices (except for products with less than 32/68k of RAM). For the cases in question, they'd all be pushing for 32 or 128 kB densities at 1/2/4/8 bit word sizes (not sure if 2-bit was common though -16 bit became available a bit later I think, not sure exactly when but at least by 1990). 512 kB chips would have been preferable for many things (especially 1MB+ models -or 512k models once 16-bit DRAMs were available), but those didn't get attractively priced until the early 90s. (128k chips were still more expensive than 32k chips -per mBit- in '88, but the gap wasn't huge and added consolidation would offset that -but also mean redesigned motherboards for 128k chips) Hmm, that's another issue: was CBM switching to 128k DRAMs already in 1988 with Atari sticking to 32k chips? (even with no advantage for CBM in DRAM prices, the added consolidation would have been significant with 512k models using 4 2048kx4-bit DRAMs vs 16 64kx4-bit DRAMs) Part of it is being reactive rather than proactive: ie if Atari had already been moving towards certain areas with evolutionary advances with the ST architecture (beyond just the BLiTTER -which was later than intended as it was), they'd have been in a better position to counter the DRAM price hike with other hardware. (designing the machines to be expandable also would have helped: a more open design adds value, especially if marketed properly, and allows existing users the attractive option of upgrading vs buying new machines as the only alternative -if you can get them to by YOUR machines, that's great, but if they have to get a whole new system, there's a much greater chance of switching to the competition -in either case there's likely to be a more saturated used market with closed box architectures as well: more people selling their old models vs upgrading -it's not like making it open to expansion would have been expensive either, just a single general expansion slot externally like PBI or various cart/expansion slots on other 8-bits -Spectrum, CoCo, VIC, C64, etc) However, even with the reactionary options, there was a fair amount of fairly quick-fix hacks possible, and trade-offs that could be good or bad. (as you said, Amstrad went the wrong way with the higher end PC models only) The fast CPU models might have been possible to get into production fairly quickly, though not nearly as easy as shifting production for existing 12/16 MHz models (had they already been in production). They'd need to implement a wait state system allowing the 68k to run on the bus all the time (as much as possible) vs interleaved only, plus an 8/16 (or 12) MHz toggle in hardware and/or software. Tacking on the blitter to lower-end models would have meant a modification to the motherboard and would depend on quantity production of the BLiTTER, and the YM2203 probably would take some modification as well. (in both cases, riser boards could have been used interim before redesigned motherboards put all on the main board) Offering more official expansion/upgrades via service centers probably would have been fairly feasible too: from the piggyback RAM upgrade to potential blitter/sound upgrades, or maybe even CPU upgrades. (adding a switch for a 16 MHz clock wouldn't be the tough part: the wait states and modified DMA arrangement would be: and I'm not sure if that would have been possible -might require replacement of the DMA and SHIFTER chips with ones supporting additional wait states, though using upgrades more like 3rd parties might have worked -either just a 16 MHz 68k fixed to the normal bus access times and only accelerating internal operations, or adding a cache/buffer on top of that -hmm, or maybe a simplified DMA replacement that left the SHIFTER alone, but allowed the CPU to run full bore in vblank and interleaved in active display -accelerating internal operations but slow bus accesses, plus waits when the floppy/HDD/etc requested DMA -hence replacing the DMA chip) Some of those options would be a bit labor intensive, but facilitated by properly trained staff and well organized upgrade kits (more so for models with more socketed chips -even without socketed, clip-on piggyback chips could ease things vs desoldering or such), and with the DRAM prices as they were (let alone new machines in general), reasonably priced (and profitable) upgrade services would have been significant. (even with slim profits, it would have meant retaining a stronger userbase and getting better software support -let alone upgrades inducing stronger support for enhanced hardware following on to the STE ) A COVOX like DAC device through the cart slot might have been a good idea too. (especially 4 separate 8-bit parallel DAC ports to write too -ie allowing rather close software emulation of PAULA, especially with faster CPUs -but better in all cases due to the quality of the DACs and the fact there's 4 hardware channels to avoid mixing+scaling -mxing/multiplexing/interleaving fixed pitch channels would be pretty easy too, but scaling for notes is where the real overhead is vs varying sample rate) Though that would be mainly useful for professional sampling/dedicated programs and demos, not games (other than better quality samples SFX due to true linear 8-bit DACs -and full concurrent use with all chip channels), but not a bad thing to support, and pretty cheap, especially if using a dedicated ASIC with the DACs+ports built-in. (again, you'd need a piggyback mixing cable or similar to mix the YM audio externally) And having an Atari branded, official device as such could be significant: more so if it was built-in on later models with added DMA. (but similar mapping for backwards compatibility) Losing the price advantage was one thing, but the VALUE advantage was another. (market share and support, compatibility, general utility and feature set, etc, etc) With CBM rather lacking in enhancing the Amiga design (especially on the low-end), Atari had a big chance to catch up and then some (especially if taking a cue from PCs in some areas), but they ended up languishing almost like CBM in that respect or comign out with upgrades still short of (and not very cost competitive with) the Amiga models available. (except the TT in some areas -I think the TT SHIFTER added real packed pixel modes and was a fair bit better in some areas than AGA which came much later anyway, and VIDEL beat AGA in every way save 18 vs 24-bit RGB and at the same time as well; 1990 was a little late, but had Atari had the TT SHIFTER crammed into lower-end models as well -like a 16 MHz STe with TT video modes- that could have been very significant, more like the Falcon concept but 2 years earlier -and with the Falcon they only offered a lower/mid-range machine and no high-end version, and even on the low-end side they made less than ideal trade-offs in some areas -lack of optional fast RAM for 32-bit full-speed work RAM separate from shared system memory, plus a 68EC020 would have been a better option for low-end models if not even offering plain 16 MHz 68k versions as well -a full range from 16 MHz 68k at the very bottom up to fast 030s and workstation class 040 models would have been great -leaving 68EC020 at the bottom end wouldn't be a bad idea either, with the TT video 16 MHz STes as the low-end options) Lots of possibilities though, many missed opportunities. (some when Jack was still in change too, but much more so after he left) I know there's a few good sites on Flare/Konix stuff. There's one with a pretty good overview from Flare from the start in '86 and all their investors, developments, etc, though I can't seem to find it at the moment. (there's also the slipstream archive, of course, with a lot of nice stuff there too) It's interesting that Flare retained full IP of the Slipstream/Flare 1 chipset (and indeed licensed it to several others -namely for set-top boxes- later on), so Atari potentially could have used that chipset in place of the problematic Panther design after it was canceled (and 3 years before the jaguar would test market), though it may have been more attractive for them to stick with in-house designs they owned the IP to (ST/TT derived hardware, perhaps a Lynx derived console, or a simpler/faster redesign of Panther to allow practical use of DRAM and more efficient bus sharing alongside the long-term Jaguar project), though the Splistream ASIC would have been really nice if Atari could get a favorable licensing agreement. (the fact that 2 of the 3 Flare engineers would be working for Atari for the next 3+ years would probably have helped ) Yes, almost certainly a culmination of things: general progressive cost reduction of the Amiga, possible a decision to slim down profit margins a bit to push competition, and stronger connections for DRAM supply at better rates. (they definitely seemed to use a lot of suppliers, but I've not seen what contemporary ST motherboard are sporting in general) The fact Commodore had more clout in the US and better connections (let alone better funding) would have been very significant in that respect. (they very fact they weren't dominating things as it was is more up to weak management at CBM than weaker product/market positioning -albeit the ST always would have had the cost advantage even with an A500 in 1985 due to simpler/cheaper design -in spite of vertical integration: that is, unless CBM had pushed a cut-down Amiga model stripped of some features to creep into the ST's price range -and if you're talking Jack staying at CBM, then that might mean Warner was forced to keep Atari Inc whole and avoid their sloppy split, so tons more possibilities there for consoles and computers -they'd have had the Amiga chipset in mid '84 if Amiga hadn't cheated them out of it; there were even plans to have a high-end game system -with later computer expansion- using the Amiga chipset for late '84, though they could have switched to an in-house chipset -possibly rainbow- once Amiga pulled support -of course, that would delay things compared to never having the Amiga deal at all and sticking with the very promising Atari Inc hardware, of which there were several chipsets to work with and tailor to a practical consumer-oriented design) The price difference issue between Atari and Commodore seems to be aide-topic on my research, but it is one that other people keep asking me about. I can't tell at the moment if it is truly related or not. At what year (and month, if you have it) did the Amiga and Atari cross prices for models with the same amount of memory? (In the US and/or in Europe.) BTW, where was the Amiga produced? I've seen a couple of European countries mentioned. "In October 1989, the A500 dropped its price from 499 GBP to 399 GBP and was bundled with the Batman Pack in the United Kingdom" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amiga_500 Couldn't find the article again but have all the magazines here. No link found for £299 to £399 for 520STFM. Article mentioned both machines and the catastrophic price change for Atari due to both events. Commodore's DRAM supply unaffected, Atari's supply affected. Amiga 500 price cut is just coincidence I suspect. Yes, it seems to have been a bit of a coincidence, and had it not been for the price INCREASE, the ST would have still had a $100 price advantage. (was that both for 512k models? -iirc some later "520ST" models were actually 1MB machines, at least for 520 STFs) It probably added to the overall mess, but as mentioned above, there were plenty of loop-holes: namely any products containing DRAM would not suffer the tax, just raw DRAM chips. However, that would also mean that overseas production would facilitate that even more (ie if the ST motherboards were produced overseas and partially or completely populated before being shipped for final assembly in the US). I think Atari may have pulled back their Asian production support in '87/88, but I'm not sure. (that would definitely make things less favorable and be unfortunately poor timing) The problems with Micron would have been a significant snag as well. I thought Commodore/MOS only produced in-house their custom chips [not to mention the 6502 CPU and its variations] and the DRAM was acquired elsewhere. I was under the impression that MOS had tried DRAM after the Commodore takeover but it didn't work out profitably for them. But that still would've given Commodore a leg up since they themselves were manufacturing much of the Amiga's custom chips in-house whereas Atari Corp. had to rely upon other manufacturers to produce their custom chips [as just about any ST owner can give you an earful about the fiascos involved with producing the BLItter and getting it to market]. Yes, so any supply issues would be more to do with CBM's position in regards to 3rd party suppliers. (they also may have been using a broader array of DRAM sources as well) As for the BLiTTER and various custom chips: that IS one definitive area where using more off the shelf solutions would help a lot. (like if they'd pushed 16 MHz CPUs on the MEGAs -let alone higher-end 520s/1040s- so not only another advantage, but one that was much more foolproof over the BLiTTER and would accelerate software not catering to the BLiTTER -and using less board space, just the added cost of the faster CPU rating and possibly a revised DMA chip -if they'd offered faster CPU models from the start, or '86 at least, that wouldn't have been a snag either though) Yeah, though if Atari (Inc or Corp) was ever going to obtain a chip fabrication company, it should have been back in '79/80 or earlier (as soon as they'd build up the revenue/position to do so after Warner's initial investment), or if not merging/buying a foundry, at least a very tight partnership of sorts (perhaps with provisions for a later merger). Synertek would seem to be the prime example for that: a very heavy supplier for Atari Inc and a relatively small chip vendor as well. (once Honeywell bought them after '79, it would have been tighter, but maybe still possible to negotiate with Honeywell -especially seeing how integral AInc was to Synertek: so much so that the crash in '83 led to Synertek becoming rather troubled and was forced to halt construction of the new Santa Cruz facility with Honeywell shutting down the Synertek division entirely in '85) It's not just an advantage of vertical integration, but also for accelerating LSI design and prototyping in general. (much tighter management and turnaround for such projects with an in-house vendor) I think by '78/79 Warner/Atari were in a favorable enough position to consider such an undertaking, and it definitely would have been a very sound investment. (perhaps it would actually have lessened the blow from the crash and internal management issues, or at least bleeding less cache since production cost would be lower and profit margins would be higher -let alone accelerating projects, and cutting R&D costs due to such)

If anything, that's an argument to leave the 5200 as-is rather than have add-ons. Compatibility was an issue, but in the end it probably wasn't make or break for the system in the long haul. (ie if they'd pushed on with it) However it was still an issue, and all the more so since competition had a module for VCS compatibility from the start. (and while plenty of platforms have done well without compatibiltiy and it's rarely ever been a make or break feature of a game console, it is always a good addition as long as it can be done reasonably efficiently without crippling the system -in the 7800 it was done OK, though it was a fair bit tacked on and the system could have been cheaper and more capable if 2600 compatibility had never been a feature -the 3200 was probably a more efficient route, at least for its time, actually evolving most of the old hardware and building on it -it seems like they were planning to morph TIA into a GTIA like chip with backwards compatible modes and possibly even add some enhancements over the normal GTIA) That said, you could certainly argue that the 7800 was easier to use to correct the issues with the 5200 (hardware wise) than the necessary marketing to make the 5200 really transition smoothly into the role of Atari's new mainstay console (with the 2600 pushing into the budget range). The 5200 had other issues besides compatibility, and of the hardware ones there's the general odd cost cutting in some areas and considerable lack of it in other areas. (it very feasibly could and should have been implemented to be a low cost, further consolidated derivative of the 1200XL or original 600 prototype -no PIA, 16k DRAM, smaller motherboard facilitated by such -as compact as possible without resorting to inefficiently tight placement of components, compact but sleek form factor, 2 controller ports -given the fact they were pretty much unused on the A8 and being removed on the 1200, simple conventional RF cable and separate power supply, relatively simple/cost effective joysticks out of the box with more advanced ones as accessories, etc -they could go the analog route with resistors and switches to allow a simple 8-way analog joystick -effectively digital from the user's side of things- or actually have a digital mode where POKEY was configured to have the POT lines used directly as I/O lines -you have 8 lines and 2 controllers, so you could configure them in leu of PIA while GTIA read the triggers and any additional signals) Once CGIA was completed, things could be even more consolidated too, plus POKEY could be stripped of the keyboard/SIO logic for just sound+POT hardware and a 28-pin package. (perhaps initially the same -or slightly modified- die with the main change being the small package, followed by a formal redesign of the chip that removed the unnecessary features and also shrunk the die for a newer manufacturing process and dropping to a narrow 28-pin DIP instead of a wide DIP) After the fact, many things could still have been corrected, but they'd gotten weaker first impressions because of that and weaker sales and support in general. The 5100 was still only a modest fix well short of an ideal redesign of the 5200. (the new controllers were nice too, though the buttons hadn't been fixed) But then there's all the non hardware related issues that, generally speaking, were the real problems with Atari at the time. Many of them are not directly tied to the 5200 specifically, though the 5200's problems were symptoms of many underlying issues at Atari Inc. There were various management problems, conflicts of interest, and other issues that needed to be addressed ASAP. They forced Atari into a downward spiral in late 1982 that was only finally getting corrected by Morgan in early '84 (with efforts starting in late '83). Had someone line Morgan come in by mid 1982 (let alone instead of Kassar from the start), disaster may have been averted entirely, but that wasn't the case. The biggest single issue was almost certainly the problematic distribution network that was showing demand/sales figures that were heavily inflated over what was actually occurring on the market. (it was growing to be sure, but not nearly as fast as Atari management was being led to believe -not only pushing for oversaturation on the hardware side, but also inducing the so-called glut of games on the market) Other issues included dual management conflicts (and conflicts of interest) with Warner and Atari Inc: one blatant example is what happened with ET. (Kassar turned the license down after Universal asked too much, but Warner then made their own deal with Spielberg directly -tying into attempts to woo him to Warner Bros studios iirc- and on top of a massive license fee of $20-25 million he made the demand that the game be released by Christmas; Kassar made the call to produce the game in such large quantities only because it was felt that that was the minimum number that could make a profit after the heavy license fee -the alternative would be risking much less investment in massive production, but definitely taking a net loss -it would have been a safer bet though, and definitely the right move in hindsight, plus there was potential in additional production if the game did sell well or possibly revised versions of the game for the VCS or different games tying into the license like the later ET Phone home on the A8) All those problems affected every area of Atari from the computers to the arcade to the home consoles and the related software. As such, Atari had much higher priority issues on their plate than retaining the near monopoly of the home game market. (as it was, without the 5200, the VCS was still holding strong as the market leader -if declining as well) Hell, even after rectifying the management issues, the issues in the computer side of things would probably be a higher priority to deal with than getting a new console out ASAP. (or you could kill 2 birds with 1 stone with something like a 1982 counterpart to the XEGS . . . or just release the 600 as originally intended and position that as the low-end consumer/game oriented computer -and high end game system- in 1982 -sort of like the 400 had originally been intended to be positioned as in 1979, but generally became impractical as such due to the high price -vs the 600 in 1982 which feasibly could have been in the same range as the 5200 at the time, or possibly lower -certainly in the $200 range by the end of the year -or maybe have the game version of the 600 even lower cost with the 400's cheap keyboard, preferably with provisions for an upgrade to full keyboard with minimal hassle and optimal cost efficiency -maybe even modular design such that the same case could be used for full and membrane keyboard units) Sticking with the 3200 even if it meant delays also might have been the preferable alternative. (a low-cost computer would have been good in either case) The 3200 was very much the same general concept as the 7800, though implementation was rather different. (a "quick fix" hack might have been to drop the new STIA chip in favor of plopping in both TIA and GTIA instead and later planning on merging them -or at least cutting cost with the release of GTIA, and then you'd really have something like the 7800 with CGIA instead of MARIA, and probably not using TIA's I/O at all in 3200 mode since you have the GTIA I/O as well as RIOT -if you enabled RIOT interrupts, that could facilitate CPU modulation tricks for driving GTIA's beeper/click sound channel to supplement TIA sound -it would be fixed volume though, but modulation tricks played on TIA channels could use hardware volume, or modulate volume for sample playback ) The revised joysticks were more like the original (supposed) concept/design inspired by RC car/plane transmitters/controllers (2-axis spring loaded potentiometer assembly) and was packed into a tight module somewhat like the vectrex used iirc and very much like modern analog pot modules on gamepads from the current and past 2 generations. (except the N64 and Saturn 1st party controllers used mechano-optical and magnetic mechanisms rather than true analog oddly enough -Gravis's Xterminator used magnetic too, like the Saturn) The PS2's pressure sensitive buttons are different than that, unless you just mean the dual analog sticks. (which should be pot modules like they were on the PS1 dual analog/dual shock controllers) The add-on concept would have been a waste as the 5200 didn't have provisions for such unfortunately. (and again, it's rather overkill for the time, especially since the system needed to push for lower cost more than more capabilities) Added RAM might have been the most useful thing for the 5200, or maybe provisions for added sound (as the Famicom used very well in Japan, as did the MSX to some extent among others), but it lacked the read/write and Phi2 lines needed for use of RAM or analog audio input. (except on late/modified 4 port and all 2 port models with VCS module support -with phi2 and analog audio input; read/write could be hacked fairly easily with phi2 there) With the VCS compatible module models, any comprehensive add-on would really be a plug-in replacement system rather than piggybacking on the old hardware: the VCS module used nothing but the power and RF out of the 5200. (like the CV add-on, it was a total VCS in a box) The planned 7800 module for the 5200 would have been the same: an entire 7800 in a box that plugged into the 5200, not very cost effective (probably moderately cheaper to produce than a full 7800), but a good idea to help bridge 5200 owners over to promote good PR and more satisfied customers. Actually, I think the VCS (or at least 7800) modules would have needed separate power input, so that's more cost and even less convenient. (if they could piggyback on the 5200's voltage regulator and PSU, that would have simplified cost and ease of installation, but I'm not sure that was the case) As for using MARIA on later models of the computers, that might have been possible, but not not particularly efficient. (vs evolutionary enhancements of ANTIC+GTIA) And again, you could argue consolidation of the existing chipset was more important than enhancements anyway. (or break from the architecture entirely with a new design -which is what the advanced technology division was pushing for with several advanced 16-bit chipsets -and those were well beyond MARIA) More RAM a la XE would have been the most straightforward expansion, perhaps dual POKEYs. (a faster CPU might have been possible, but I'm not sure -it would depend on cost/availability of DRAM -3 or perhaps even 4 MHz rated CPUs shouldn't have been unreasonable, but the main issue was having fast enough memory to facilitate that, and anything short of 3.58 MHz would have needed a different system clock -unless they were already using 7.16 MHz) And if they WERE t upgrade GTIA/ANTIC, higher dot clock (probably double resolution) versions of all the existing graphics modes might have been one of the more straightforward enhancements. (an added 80 pixel wide direct 256 color mode would have been nice too, let alone more conventional indexed color character modes -be it internal or external CRAM/tables- or at least bumping it to 16 color registers to allow 16 freely selected colors for 16 color character/bitmap modes)

Umm, no, Paula has to loop the samples and set the samples for PAULA to read, it's not a hardware sample synth chip, it's a hardware DMA PCM decoder chip with variable sample rates. All it can do is stream and modify playback rate AFIK. The CPU has to set all the loops, etc. Now, for normal, long (ie close to/over 1 second or a fairly large fraction of a second) samples, that CPU resource is negligible, but for the tiny, tiny samples mentioned above, we're talking thousands of loops per second. (ie what the PCE/TG-16 does in hardware, or full sample synth hardware -like Ricoh's 8 channel PCM synth chip or Sony's SPC700 unit in the SNES- though the latter can also use samples of any length rather than only 32 byte/word waveforms) Longer samples use LESS CPU resource, but tiny samples (in the context of true chip synth emulation) will take significant CPU resource, ever closer to software PWM. Have you ever listened to the Softsynth tunes on the A8? The waveforms were calculated via CPU and played writing to all 4 "DAC"s. due to the real 4 channels, no interferences happen there. So what, that doesn't change anything I said before. 4-bit linear volume sounds a bit better than the logarithmic channels on the AY/YM chips, but both are limited by the low resolution and both take a ton of CPU resource. And the higher the sample rate, the worse it sounds compared to 8-bit (or higher res) playback. If you compared 16 kHz 4 channel MOD on POKEY vs 16 kHz 4 channel software mixed 3-channel to 8-bit (or higher) look-up hacked MOD on the ST, the latter will sound significantly better. (as it would compared to AY hardware channels as well) You get the added noise from 3 separate updates (intermediate values), but that's the same sacrifice you'd need to make for 6-bit PCM on POKEY. (except it would sound worse due to the lower res and 4 vs 2 or 3 updates on the AY -2 channel hacking is coarser than 3 but can still manage OK 8-bit and a good improvement over single hardware channels, at least at higher samples rates -at 4 kHz it probably isn't worth the effort or the added space for 8-bit vs 4-bit samples) And no, those are very resource intensive, at least with the 68k. The 6502 is very good at doing fast/simple tasks (the PC Engine would be better at software MOD than the ST by a good margin because of that -DAC methods aside), and that's where it shines compared to the 68k or some others. (for tightly coded demos it would be more competitive though) On top of that, you're talking demos, not easily implemented realtime in-game stuff: with the 6502, interrupts are a realistic option as 6502 interrupts are very light and also takes care of timing in hardware (for easy multitasking), but the 68000 has very heavy interrupt overhead by comparison. (hence why you don't often see software PWM stuff on the ST vs what you do with POKEY -at least in homebrew stuff) Interrupt driven modulation on the A8 is very practical due to the CPU architecture, on the ST it eats tons of CPU time that's already pressed tight for graphics. (and low sample rate PCM is more practical in-game even, not MOD stuff, but fixed rate ~4 kHz stuff; you could do wave modulations at that same frequency -ie limited pitch- or a little higher with similar CPU respurce as PCM) The use of the 6502 arch CPU on the Lynx also made it very useful for software modulation and PCM playback with reasonably little overhead. Again, you CAN do the same thing with modulation on the ST's AY (albeit 3 channels), but it's intensive and no different than doing PWM on a beeper other than having hardware volume control and you have 3 hardware channels plus noise and intermittent use of modulation and hardware synth. http://battleofthebits.org/arena/Entry/down+and+dirty/3657/ There's nothing special about POKEY that makes it better for software modulation other than the built-in timers. (and only if the system doesn't have other interval timers to use -hell, in the A8, if you had at least 1 interval timer separate from POKEY you could use the GTIA channel as a 5tn hardware channel for PWM -but not other modulations like triangle or saw since there's no volume control, but pulse is the most significant in sound and simplest to do -and is in the ST example above and many SID tunes -SID does PWM/variable width pulse wave in hardware and POKEY sort of does but only for periodic noise) It's also worse than Paula for software tiangle/saw due to the limitations of 4-bit output vs 8-bit. (the logarithmic volume of the AY would also be limiting in that respect) PWM (pulse/square wave) has no use for such resolution beyond normal volume control and will sound just as good on a 1-bit beeper toggle as a 16-bit DAC. That's also why the Lynx is good for CPU modulation: a bunch of interval timers and 8-bit DAC mode (or at least 8-bit linear volume) on the 4 PSG channels. POKEY would, for all intents and purposes, be just as limited for hacking as the AY with some trade-offs. (single channel PCM would generally sound better on POKEY, but the difference for similarly optimized samples won't be extreme -and both will get noticeably staticy at higher sample rates -though have less low sample rate artifacts) For chip synth, the AY has higher frequency resolution (12 vs , hardware envelope (also hacked for low-res saw or triangle -usually saw, without CPU modulation), and stereo (though that's moot), but it lacks the fully general purpose 4 hardware channels (just 3 tone channels plus noise) and lacks the periodic pulse wave noise of POKEY (and TIA). Both are much better than the SN76489. (which itself is better than TIA for music, but generally worse for SFX ) There's almost no use of 3 channel sample playback systems on the ST using hardware channels, so it's really hard to compare, and the one openly available tracker is weaker than the ones for the Spectrum and CPC. Compare the best Spectrum sample stuff (3 channel hardware via AY) to 4 channel POKEY MOD stuff at similar sample rates and you'll see only a moderate improvement over the AY. (it's also up to proper formatting of the samples and good preprocessing) POKEY is also incapable of simulating 8-bit PCM (or higher) like the AY can, and that's important for higher sample rate stuff, you could do 6-bit max, and that's combing all 4 channels with sequential writes: thus you'd get the added noise the 3-channel AY hack also suffers from

If that's remotely representative of the general perception of the time, it demonstrates just how weak the marketing was for the A8 by Warner up to that point. Otherwise, Atari would have been known as a computer company for half a decade by that point in the mass media: ie a large, multidivision company with major stake in the Arcade and home video game markets as well as the home computer market and beyond. There was no real "switch" to selling computers, but there was a decline in video game sales from the crash and a new and different push for the computer side. (and the Arcades were with a totally separate company) The bigger thing is that the mass media doesn't seem to have had a decent understanding or realization that Atari Corp was a totally new company taking on parts (ie the consumer division and some staff) of the old Atari Inc (then a corporate shell) with the Arcade division breaking away entirely. Though there does seem to be some common reference to the "new" Atari (albeit that would also be vagule accurate for the defunct NATCO ), but rather vague in general. The "Atari switched to making computers" thing seems to have been a major misconception of the time though, almost certainly bolstered in regions most severely impacted by the crash. (ie when availability of any non-computer video games pretty much dried up from '84-86 -ie not available at all in retail stores- or took even longer to come back in other cases -I think some regions in the US only saw Nintendo really start to come in in '87 -as with a lot of things, the east and west coast "tend setting" regions seemed to recover first by far, and California may have been the quickest to recover in general -maybe the least heavily impacted as well, though a lot of this seems to be limited to anecdotal evidence and I'm not sure there's comprehensive sales statistics with regional breakdowns to back things up) If it's indeed completely true that Atari Inc hadn't been well-known for their computers before hand (in the mass market -as Apple, Commodore, Tandy, IBM, etc), that would definitely indicate a weak point in Warner/AInc's marketing and yet another facet of their management problems. (I know they were stepping up marketing in '83/84 to some degree -like the Alan Alda ads- but that was a bit late given all the opportunities they had for the 3 years prior to that -and Europe was another story entirely) The less than ideal decisions on A8 hardware/configuration/feature set/evolution was one thing, but not pushing marketing hard enough is another. (especially given hoe sensitive the US market tends to be for that) The tie-in was Sears was a good move, but if advertising was weak, that would have been a major limiting factor. He really wasn't that into the games though, he was into the business side of things not the entertainment or the end software, etc. Mike Katz or other management from the entertainment divisions would be the ones to ask, or others on the CBM side more related to games or hardware design. He was interested in video games from a business perspective and the fact that they were an integral part of the company (especially depending how things with the ST went). That's exactly why it was a smart move to have separate management for the game/entertainment side of things, he had a pretty good idea of the electronics/computer market in general and how to do business in a way he'd found successful by years of experience, but marketing and management of specific divisions was a separate issue. (Lennard handled the technical/R&D management iirc and Katz was brought in for the games/entertainment management -and convinced Tramiel to create a dedicated entertainment division of Atari Corp -which was initially just Katz in a single office) He was also most definitely interested in competitive business practices and continuing to push the Japanese out of the market. It's a shame that Warner hadn't found that sort of management early on with Atari Inc: someone with experience in the general market field and good business sense vs what they got with Kassar. (Morgan also seems to have been quite capable, Busnell was not -from a business perspective) And, again, having smart 2ndary management/marketing (like Katz -and others for other respective divisions) would have rounded things out nicely. I only type this from my MacBook because neither Atari nor the Amiga have a modern platform as a realistic alternative. Perhaps had Jack Tramiel and Irving Gould put away their sharp weapons when the Atari/Commodore lawsuits were settled and agreed to combine the ST and Amiga into a single shared platform, we would have a viable third computer platform to this day [and I don't mean Linux]... There's no reason they'd have to collaborate, but either could have pushed for licensed manufacturers to create a general mass market standard (apple could have done the same and did later with Mac clones -albeit pretty late on, and the Apple II was the one with the most potential for a universal standard). In either case you'd promote clones more that way too, but the ST's hardware was already somewhat clone friendly, and careful management (and making sure the primary companies had control over defining new additions to the standard) might have worked. In the US, PCs were already pretty solidified by the mid/late 80s and cutting through them in the long run would have been tough (though perhaps possible), but Europe definitely had room for a new standard. (and for a time, the ST seemed to possibly fit the bill) One thing that kills the ST as a semi-open/licensed standard is the lack of expansion (without internal modification), and that's one issue Atari Inc had finally rectified with the XL models but jumped back to the closed box with the ST. (the A500 was limited in expansion as well, but the socketed cips helped at least -for low-end models, a single, general purpose expansion port for simple modules or full expansion slot systems would be a nice route to take while certain higher-end models could have built-in expansion slots as well as direct general-slot compatibility -maybe slimline desktops only using the single external slot as well to maintain a sleek basic form factor -aside from internal RAM expansion) Plus, there was more than just the Microsoft end of PCs too, there was GEMDOS on PC as an option (somewhat niche, but the ST and Amiga were niche to some extent as well compared to mass market sales) and IBM's rather nice OS/2, especially later versions. (but like many things, it seems to have ended up crippled by corporate bureaucracy -as with IBM's competition in the PC hardware market-) And, of course, if DRI had been more open to IBM's terms for the PC's use of CP/M, they could have taken MS's place on the market and things could have been quite different in other areas. (DRI would have had the clout to deflect Apple, more resources for R&D in general, the PC would have had a better OS from the start with more promising growth, etc, etc) The licensing opening up was, from what I understand, more pure business than any improved relationships. Remember, the ST got quite a few licenses from Atari Games in the mid/late 80s. (including one of the best -if not the best- versions of Gauntlet out there at the time) Albeit that was stuff published by 3rd parties; Atari Corp wouldn't license Atari Games stuff until later, let alone Tengen publish on Atari Corp platforms. It's a shame that Warner forced them into such a negative position. The 2 being separate companies wasn't the issue, it was the way they were split up that screwed things over. (and also contributed to Atari Corp not retaining video game programming talent from Atari Inc -again, the Arcade is not where the home game development came from, all ports and original games were handled by console programmers separately -maybe crossover in some cases, but I don't think too much) The GB was a good design though, it did what it was intended for and fit the market well. Monochrome screens were not only cheaper, but had better contrast ratios than color screens of the time (and possibly better viewing angles) making them the only practical option for unlit screens. (the only practical route for the all critical battery life, let alone lesser issues like bulk and cost) The price point was OK for a deluxe system, and even the size wasn't that huge of an issue if it just hadn't been for the battery hungry nature of the system. The later GameGear suffered similar problems, again mainly due to battery life. (they even had strong 1st party software and great advertising) I don't think you could even get decent 6-bit RGB color depth for 1989/1990 commodity reflective passive matrix LCDs, probably just barely in 1991 or '92 (the Lynx 2's screen seems almost playable -for some people at least- in the unlit sleep mode, so a reflective screen of equal quality might have pushed that into the range of acceptability). Atari dropped the Lynx ~1993 though, so it never got a chance to have a 3rd revision with consolidated/lower power chipset (moderately decreasing load) and a reflective unlit screen (dramatically reducing load), but Sega totally missed their chance at such, in spite of haning onto the GG until '96. (from '97 onward it was more or less dead in terms of active development, just a static product -and would have died in '97 if not for Majesco licensing it) So, the options for Atari providing a more mass market version of the Lynx (in cost, battery life, and form factor -albeit the Lynx I was bulkier than it needed to be-) would have been to offer a low-end grayscale model, perhaps with higher quality screens than the GB (maybe smaller screen size than the color Lynx as well), or to attempt to push a reflective color screen instead, but I don't think that would have been acceptable. (even in grayscale, the Lynx should have been more impressive than the GB in several areas, more so if the screen had less blur and a fairly high contrast ratio. (at least better than the GB's 4 shades; screens pushing boarderline ~8 shades would be significant, with full 16 shade capable grayscale later on -prior to color reflective screens) Developers would need to cater to both color and B/W models, but that shouldn't have been a huge issue. (and I'll bet the cheaper/smaller/much longer battery life Lynx model would have sold better by far) In technical terms it would be more like the Neo Geo Pocket: significantly more advanced than the GB (albeit without the neat scaling stuff), but still grayscale. (except it would be introduced side by side with the GB rather than on the eve of the GBC -with all models switched over to color long before the GBC) Same thing with the GG, except with the 1991 release it was almost to the point where reflective color LCDs could be acceptably usable. (so at very least a shorter turnaround to unlit color models) Nintendo also didn't release the Game Boy pocket until 1996, so competition faced the same basic design and form factor from '89 to '95. (though that also means they faced the same awesome battery life up to '96 with the GBP only a fraction of the brick models -which is one reason why it was important for the brick models to stay in production; if they'd gone with 2 AAs rather than AAAs it wouldn't have been nearly as dramatic and easier for consumers in other respects -AAs being more commonly used in general -the brick models were also a hell of a lot louder than the GBP/color models) The MSX was not going to be the prime computer to push into the US market as such (NEC's 8-bit machines dominated the Japanese market and would have been the most likely to push into the US if not blocked by the C64 and PC/clones -and the 16-bit 9801 line as well in the higher-end more directly placed against PCs) The MSX was more of a niche market in Japan as a casual computer, it lasted a long time of course, but NEC dominated by far. Also, it wasn't a Japanese only standard, it was an attempt at an international standard with some US companies also joining in and contributing significantly to defining the standard. (namely Spectravideo who's earlier computers were prime contributors to the MSX hardware design standard) It wasn't some sinister plot to invade the US market. (actually, had NEC pushed for the PC8801 -or previous PC-8000- to be released in the US early on, that could have been rather significant with the right marketing at least -especially with the 1979 PC-8000 being among the first home/business computers capable of running CP/M out of the box) The closest thing in the US prior to the PC would have been the TRS-80 model II, and that almost certainly would have been more expensive out of the box. (plus the PC-8000 offered true bitmap graphics modes and color, including a 160x100 8-color 3-bit RGB graphics mode) NEC also had vertical integration and a huge market share (monopoly into the early 90s) in Japan with the PC88/98 series, so that would have been significant in the long run as well. (not until cheap DOS clones in the early 90s did their monopoly begin to crumble) The machines weren't really great for games either, but all were better than contemporary IBM machines, and in some cases better than the ST. (at least in sound; graphics would depend on the CPU model used and the machine in question -none of the 8801 models would have matched the ST in CPU pushed graphical capabilities, but all models from '85 onward had later models with SVGA competitive graphics in some modes -but not enough CPU grunt to really push things hard; the PC9801 series was another story though)

I think that's wrong: I've never heard of Sega enforcing any sort of exclusivity on 3rd parties publishing for their: they may have made attractive deals to better compete against Nintendo and form strong relationships along with licensed/commissioned 2nd/3rd party games, but not anything like Nintendo did with exclusive contracts, limited production, etc. And Sega was very weak with the SMS in Japan and the US, better in the US, but still well behind Atari in terms of market share. (the SMS may have been ahead of the 7800 but definitely well behind composite 2600+7800 sales in the late 80s; the often quoted 2 million SMS sales in the US seems very wrong though since the 7800 sold at least 3.77 million in the US alone and given the market share -and presumably how much of that was 2600 sales- as well as general anecdotal accounts, it seems like the SMS was far closer to the 7800 in popularity than that, if not ahead of it) The problem wasn't lack of focus: the 2600, 7800, and ST were all strong products to push, and while the XEGS was really not that good of an idea (or at least not in execution and timing), the real issue was general lack of funding and in-house development resources. (heavily exacerbated by the many issues tied to the sloppy split by Warner -a smooth transition would have helped a ton, and should have meant a timely release of the 7800 and quite possibly more revenue on top of a nice head-start in the market) The XEGS really didn't make that much sense as it was though: I know Katz was against it, but Tramiel (I think it was Jack pushing for it, Lennard may have had something to do with it too -aside from hardware) was set on pushing a product in the entry level computer sector iirc and the XEGS was the result. I'm not sure why they couldn'tdidn't jsut release a gaming bundle with the 65XE, maybe tweak the design a bit to make it more convenient (like moving the cart slot back to the top), but as it was the 65XE was really the same machine but in a more compact form factor. (other than the cart slot, it really was more convenient to use than the XEGS+keyboard, and probably cheaper to manufacture) The way it was marketed was a bit odd too, placed more as a game console against the NES, which was not the original concept from what I understand. (games/entry level consumer interest would have been part of it, but it was really supposed to be a low-end game-oriented computer unless I'm mistaken) In any case, it didn't sap software resourced any more than developing for the A8 line in general . . . Hmm, actually, if the XEGS would have been useful at any point, it would have been back in '84 as an alternative to the 7800 as well as a tie-in to the computer line. (given the conflict over GCC, that could have been "plan B" so to speak, though, again, it seems like a gaming bundle of the A8 line alone could have made more sense -in '84 probably the 600XL due to cost) For that matter, the 5100/5200 Jr might have been a consideration (let alone further consolidation more like the 600XL or XE motherboards), but I think Atari Inc had already announced the discontinuation of the 5200 along with already hyping the 7800 and starting production. (so at that point it may have simply confused things more than it was worth, and a console/game computer directly compatible with the A8 line would mean one less distinct platform to support -albeit the 5200's design could have facilitated lower cost if consolidated properly, but that was pretty much off the table by that point) If they were going to have any chance of keeping the A8 profitable in the long run (ie to the end of the 80s at least), 1984 and 1985 seem to have been the final windows of opportunity. (and '84 got largely ruined by the split and messy transition) The XE-M seems to have been a rather odd idea too. (why put a high-end sound chip in a low-end 8-bit? -vs a higher-end revision of the ST- and why not just use dual POKEYs if you wanted boosted sound? -maybe plan to later produce a consolidated dual POKEY with redundant circuitry cut and general die shrink, maybe on a surface mounted package -also could have come in handy on the 7800) CGIA would have been a significant cost savings for the A8 line (or 5200) as well, and it had reached LSI prototypes by fall of '83 (by the time of Morgan's freeze), so I wonder why it never got implemented. Perhaps the necessary engineers (and possibly some documents) got lost in the transition to ACorp, though as long as they retained a certain critical amount of prototype hardware, documentation, and schematics, Atari Corp should have been able to complete it independently. (as with the JAN/VCS-on-a-chip ASIC for later model 2600 Jrs -albeit I think it had originally been slated to be implemented for all Jrs from the start and be released by the end of '84, so significant delays on that side as well) That seems rather odd, especially since the biggest piracy was in Europe (with tapes) though I'm sure disks got a fair amount of piracy from the early 80s through the mid 90s when they fell out of favor. Piracy is something that often leads to scapegoating and reactive responses rather than proactive ones. (DRM has made more of a mess of things than it has combated piracy on the whole) There will always be piracy (though it can be curtailed within reason), if the product is good it will sell well in spite of piracy and if it's bad it won't sell well or get pirated as much. (price and convenience is also important, if the product is more affordable, fewer will be likely to resort to piracy, etc) However, with the A8 being fairly strong on the cart media side of things, that should have made it among the least pirated systems (percentage wise) in the US since carts are not cheap or trivial to pirate at all. (and limited to professional piracy usually, not casual disk swapping) So, if anything, developers could simply have pushed more for cart based games, the XEGS would have no impact on that given it was no different than any of Atari's computers. (came without disk or tape drives pack-in, and emphasized cartridge media -albeit the XE made it a bit less convenient to use carts, but that should have meant a tweak to the XE design, if anything, putting the slot back on top, or at least on the side like the 520 ST/1200) In any case, it's been my impression that the XEGS was not designed for any such reason: it was to be a more attractive form factor entry level computer with attractive market positioning for the casual consumer (so to speak). Again, I think they could have done that with the 65XE (especially as it was down to $99 retail earlier in '87 -vs the $80 7800 and $50 2600 Jr) and all they had to do was come out with a gaming bundle and corresponding marketing. (though, again 1987 was pretty late and a bit wasteful to even bother pushing that with how far the A8 line had declined, even '86 would have been a bit iffy) A computer add-on for the 7800 might have made more sense to fill the entry level computer role and tie into the casual consumer/entertainment market at the time: obviously the add-on from GCC was a bust, but that doesn't mean Atari corp couldn't push their own add-on module (let alone in a different form factor -ie more like the 7800 XM, but with less RAM -ie 32-48k mapped directly into the cart ROM space- and no YM2151 obviously) and including high-score compatibility wouldn't have been a bad idea either. (as long as that wouldn't have legal conflicts with GCC) Hell, maybe they could have even marketed such a system as a general enhancement add-on for the 7800 with a higher-end version including a keyboard and added computer-oritented software. (plus an expansion bundle with just the keyboard+software for users initially buying the module alone) That could have been smart with the first RAM expanded and POKEY embedded games (Summer/Winter games using 32k SRAM chips -only using 16k of that though- and BallBlazer using a POKEY) so they could have left those as plain carts with support/requirement for the add-on and thus cut out the per-game overhead. (and as long as the add-on was priced and marketed carefully, consumers should have realized the advantages to shelling out more for every game) For that matter, it may have been wise to introduce a new 7800+ with the module's capabilities built-in, further cutting costs and allowing the module to be more sparingly produced. (they'd have to be careful to not push the 7800's price up significantly though, one thing might have been designing the expanded RAM's memory map to fully displace the onboard SRAM, so perhaps a single 32kx8 SRAM, though 4kSRAM and the rest DRAM -with embedded interface ASIC- may have been more cost effective overall -plus it would also mean that one of those enhanced games could have been pack-in with similar or less overhead than having a chip on-cart, or better yet have it built into the system itself like the XEGS or later Master Systems) Note that Drackisback corrected me a bit on that a few posts later. (and I mused on the issue a bit more -and hand't realized how the Lynx got cut either) The Jag may have helped in some areas, but it could be argued that investing in it hurt them as well, and more so than sticking with the computers and Lynx may have. (if not investing in all 3, though the main issue was that Atari Corp was a mess by '93 and they were lucky to do as well as they did with the Jaguar -makes you wonder how Jack could have managed things though -from '89 onward- let alone someone as capable as Katz heading the entrtainment division) Yes, we discussed a lot of this in a couple recent threads, and not just the 020, but a lot of other things like no 12 or 16 MHz 68k models (same issue with the Amiga), not offering good lower-end upgraded standards, pushing more to match the Amiga than go ahead with their own evolutionary path or perhaps push more against the PC standards emerging, etc. (at very least the MEGA should have been 16 MHz -or had 16 MHz models- from the start, if not a fastRAM and FPU option, those were more important than a blitter in many respects -and simple hardware scroll registers in the SHIFTER would have been a qicker/cheaper addition that would still have been very significant overall -and could have been reasonably added on ALL newer model STs with the old SHIFTER totally discontinued -making support more likely) Upgrading to a YM2203 is a nice idea too, at least for higher-end models. (along with DMA sound, but off the shelf was more foolproof, maybe aiming with a simpler DAC array in a compact ASIC with direct write modes for software PCM playback of better quality than the YM/AY hack and without software scaling/mixing, and then later introduce a DMA circuit to add to it)

Whenever I've talked about it to Leonard Tramiel, he stated that their feeling for lack of success was because they couldn't get the Lynx down cheap enough to compete with the GameBoy. They felt if they could have offered their full color system at the same price, they would have won. Their biggest cost was the color LCD, which they had negotiated with a supplier to provide at a price that would have allowed them to get the price point they wanted on the Lynx. That supplier fell through and they wound up suing him. I think that's a big part of it, but probably not the biggest part. The Lynx suffered from many of the same shortcomings as the Game Gear except for 2 major differences: it had a big head start but was also not backed by a huge game company with strong in-house development, strong funds for marketing and commissioned/licensed game development, and greater public interest from consumers and 3rd party developers. (albeit the Lynx seems to have been more popular in the UK than the GG -which did oddly poorly given Sega's popularity there) And even there, Nintendo had Sega beaten. (and a head start) The common problems were price point, bulky size, and short battery life (and 6 AAs at that). The battery life issue was probably the biggest issue for a portable/handheld console: on top of a console that's large and relatively expensive, it also eats through batteries adding more cost overhead and more bulk (if you wanted spare batteries to extend play time). That wouldn't change on any color handheld until LCD screens got to the point where reflective (unlit) color screens had reasonably adequate contrast ratios. (at least enough to allow reasonable 6-bit RGB representations -well short of the 12-bit used on both, but also acceptable enough to make the cost/bulk/power savings well worth it for such an unlit "Jr" model) I'm not sure when those minimum requirements were met with mass market screens, but I know it was some time in the mid 90s. (maybe even by 1992 or '93 for boarderline screens -ie ones that were more or less on par with the 1989 gameboy screen but in color, and more acceptable ones following by '95 with progressive improvements there on out) The GG and Lynx were both powerful enough to compete through the Game Boy color years with ever consolidated chipsets and ever reduced cost had both companies continued to support the platforms. Except Atari was in trouble and poorly managed by the early 90s, and Sega oddly didn't pushed for a revised GG even by 1995 or '96 when they pulled resources from it in favor of the Saturn. (1st and 3rd party GG development pretty much dried up by '97 and it was left as a more or less "dead" platform being sold with minimal advertising and no new software -Majesco kept it going into the late 90s though) The battery life issue really was a biggy though, something the GB actually declined in as time went on. (the original GB line was exceptional -upwarsds of 30 hours in better circumstances- but the pocket and to lesser extent color versions cut that back a fair bit, the GBA did it more so than the color and I don't think any models of DS have matched the better examples of the original 4 AA brick gameboy models for continuous play time on batteries) OTOH, that would actually make things easier as time went on too: if Sega and Atari had pushed more and more eficient designs, the batter life gap could have closed much more quickly. (I think existing GG models -at least late ones- may actually be into the brick GB battery life range if you disable the backlight, albeit that's on 6 AAs, but still a pretty good indication) The Deluxe form factor of the Lynx with ambidextrous layout was very neat, but it may have been wise to cut that feature at least for such cost/size reduced unlit "Jr" models in favor of making it as cost effective and compact as possible. (Gravis was the only one to do that with gamepads for that matter, so most left handed people were probably used to playing "right handed" controllers as such -joysticks/gamepads aren't even really defined that way, you see arcade joysticks configured often on the left, but home console and PC joysticks intended for the right hand or either, so I'm not sure that was ever a very necessary feature at all) Unless Warner was offering it for loans/IOUs like much of Atari consumer, TTL/Atari Corp couldn't afford it. Much of that ties into the links to Marty's (wgungfu's) posts I pointed out in my previous post. However, not having Atari Games really was on the bottom of the list of problems: the arcade staff didn't have much to do with AInc's consumer game development (just the coin-op games), and it was the loss of the AInc game programming staff (except some that crossed over to the computer side of things at AInc -as much of the computer programming staff was retained) that hurt things as well as a general lack of funds to invest in 1st party or commissioned games. (they did have some significant game programming talent left from the computer staff, but even with that they were very strapped for cash, at least until '87/88) Similar reasons cover the limited advertising. (though Katz did a bang up job considering what he had to work with) By the time they had remotely reasonable funding to compete as such, Nintendo had already more or less tied up the market for that generation. (the very fact that the 2600 and 7800 fit into somewhat of a budget niche probably helped keep them in a somewhat separate category rather than dying off completely under the pressure -Sega OTOH had the funding and the software to compete from the start, but not the right marketing or management -and while Tonka improved that a bit, it was too little too late to take the market from Nintendo that generation: Katz managed to make the Genesis make a pretty notable splash on the market towards the end of 1989 and especially 1990 -an up-hill battle, of course) Another thing with the 7800 is that it wasn't really a hit in Europe (it did OK, possibly better market share in the US, but still well behind Sega and Nintendo -market share was split more evenly in Europe), so they didn't really get to tap that programming/development talent opposed to the ST. (who knows what might have happened with a next gen console had they released it, especially if related to the ST line -hell, if they made it architecturally similar with an updated version of the ST -like the ST, though that should have been better- it could have helped increase support for the new computer platform as well) Again, those linked posts really summarize things well; a ton of the problems had not so much to do with Tramiel buying Atari consumer, but rather how Warner managed the sale and transition. (selling the entire company as a single entity would have been nice, but the split could have been very favorably managed as well had Warner been prudent) With a smooth transition, Atari Games could have maintained a positive relationship with ACorp and made favorable licensing agreements for new arcade games and other cooperation. (vs the strained relationship they got instead) Kent's book is good for quotes, but bad for commentary and fact checking. It's very inconsistent for anything other than direct quotes and figures; if he'd been assiduous in cross-checking his information, Curt and Marty would have had a lot less work cut out for them in some areas. (he might have jump-started digging into some other historical areas as well ) I haven't more than skimmed his book myself, but I'm not sure if he even has comprehensive interviews from the Tramiels, Katz, or various others integral to the period. (I know he didn't interview Ted Dabney or anyone else who could have debunked Nolan's many lies and other myths ) By the time Atari Corp was evening out and actually getting some decent funding, Nintendo had pretty much tied up the market and what was left was a bit tricky. What's more is that Jack was stepping down with Sam transitioning into the role as CEO/President, and Katz left about the same time Jack did towards the end of '88 iirc. So both of them were gone for the Lynx, STe, various console proposals up to the Panther which was then canceled with the Jaguar as a followon, TT030, Flacon, and then the Jag finally released in late '93. And, by that point, Atari was in big trouble, I think this quote from Marty sums it up well: Truthfully, Leonard didn't have much to do with the daily operations, he was more involved with the products themselves. And I'm not sure that Sam would have been able to change things if he didn't have the heart attack. Every since he had taken over, the company itself was on a downward spiral. When Jack turned the company over to him, he had mananged to bring the company out of the red and in to the black - shedding all the debt they took on from Warner in the purchase. That was his dream after all, to be able to hand something solid over to his sons and retire. Sam managed to take it from a multi-division multi-product company to a single product company by the time Jack came back in. If they would have fought to the last $$$, there would have been nothing left of a legacy for his kids, hence the reverse merger to get out while they still could. Truthfully, I would rather have had Jack not retire back in the late 80's and have him stick around for the oncoming Wintel onslaught to see how he would have dealt with that. I can't picture just turning tail and closing down the computer division like that. ----------- That all ties into the poor planning/management of the transition on Warner's side unfortunately, see below: Katz was an excellent addition in that respect, but in as far as transitional staff: that again goes back to Warner's mismanagement of things. (Morgan was the president of Atari Inc and the one handling some very promising reorganization of the company, so he and some of the senior management probably should have been retained for a time at least in the interim to smooth the transition -quite possibly allow his plans to be completed or at least adjusted for the change in plans)

Yes, Atair Corp had planned on using the consoles to support them from the start. One thing that did spur support for the 7800 and getting the Jr out was strongly increasing sales of the 2600 in summer and fall (though the holiday season) of 1985, the same time Nintendo was running their small failed NY test market (the first success would come in early '86). I think Atari ran out of 2600 back stock at that point and had production going again (if they'd ever stopped), but couldn't match the demand. (not sure if the Jr was out by the end of the year or if they were pushing out new Vaders in the interim) Mike Katz arrival and the corresponding formation of the ACorp entertainment division also spurred the game console side of things. (Katz was brought onboard in mid '85 as part of the lead up to the 7800 launch -Warner and Tramel having settled the GCC issue earlier that year) Also, some good stuff here on the overall transitional issues from Inc to Corp: http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__100__p__2181412#entry2181412 http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__125__p__2183245#entry2183245 http://www.atariage.com/forums/topic/171887-the-tramiels/page__st__125__p__2183904#entry2183904 I don't know. If using a quantitative metric to meausre 'dominate', I'd probably use the 'ol 80/20 rule (because IMO a #1 position doesn't necessarily imply domination). And certainly by that measure I'd argue that the Japanesedo not dominate today. In terms of games development I would even question whether Japan should be considered a #1 or #2, but even if #1 in games develoment they do not dominate as in the 80's, when it seemed as if every game was coming from Japen. And again in terms of current gen console sales, though Wii and PS3 sales combined certainly are greater than Xbox 360 sales, Xbox 360 is now alternating back and forth as the #1 console sold. And again, no matter what, it makes up much more than 20% of the current market. Now the handheld market, that they dominate! But there is the iPhone.... I meant as the final outcome of a generation, and the result very well leave Nintendo and Sony with over 80% net market share. (I was thinking more 70%+ for "dominant", otherwise the NES technicaly didn't dominate the US market as such given the Intev+2600+7800+SMS took over 20% of the overall hardware sales of that generation, more so if you go by the late 80s when the competition was most active -by '91 those other 8-bits were more or less dead) OTOH, it's also been largely due to heavily built-up US/western divisions that Japanese companies have been successful and Sega is sort of an odd case. (Service Games and Rosen Enterprises both founded by Americans and Dave Rosen still head of the US board of directors until 1996, plus the very heavy build-up of Sega of America in the Katz and Kalinske years having very much to do with their success) Atari Corp was offered the distribution rights to the MD back in '88 interestingly enough, but Rosen and Tramiel couldn't agree on the terms though Katz favored it. (Katz and Jack would both leave Atari Corp towards the end of that year, Katz planned a break from the industry but stepped back in early to join Sega just after the launch of the Genesis -I believe he was recruited, he laid the groundwork for the later success and launched the first truly successful competitive ad campaign with "Genesis Does" -also got a favorable deal with EA that avoided them going unlicensed, started the Sega Sports franchise, pushed for celebrity tie-ins, and more -he was replaced by Kalinske in 1991 -transitioning in late 1990) At the time, the MD was hardly an obvious success (the hardware specs and Sega's software support were the only knowns), Atari Corp had stronger market share in the US than Sega at the time, and they also had plans for a next-gen game console (ST derivatives among other things). In the end their own plans didn't materialize as products and there were other screw-ups, but you could also blame those on the general downward spiral after Jack left. (both computers and cosnoles, and losing Katz was probably a major blow as well -makes me wonder how Jack and Katz would have done things if they'd stayed)

That sounds a bit odd. You were really keeping up with events in such detail back then? (most people -even atari fans- didn't really understand the actual fact of Atari Games being a separate company or Atari Corp being a totally different company than any previous "Atari") Nintendo was a nobody on the consumer hardware market in the US until spring of 1986 anyway, they weren't big news nationwide until that fall/winter and even then only people who actually took interested in the industry. What about Sega? They'd have been just as prominent at the time as a competitor. And it was Warner that screwed things up with the split. Separating the coin-op division wasn't the critically problematic thing, it was how Warner managed the whole thing and also ruined Morgan's carefully laid plans for reorganization. Marty made some interesting comments on this recently: Consumer Division. That included the IP, manufacturing, distribution, and Consumer related buildings. No, AFAIK the Coin people were never touched. They simply took everyone involved in the Coin portion of Atari Inc. and spun them off as Atari Games Corp. Yes, not to mention putting the have a job/don't have a job on Jack's head because it was either you're going to the new Atari Corporation or you're looking for employment elsewhere. Which when I talked to Leonard he stated how they all felt horrible about it going in. Knowing they were going to have to do that with a bulk of the Atari Inc. people. And most of the people didn't have a clue after that July 4th weekend that they were laid off because of how Warner handled it - no announcement to the employees, no nothing. They thought they were returning to work at Atari Inc. busines as usual with no idea the buildings, assets, etc. now belonged to TTL. Warner just let everything sit there and put it in Jack's lap for a transition, simply handing over the keys. Literally everything - employees, buildings, ongoing contracts, etc., etc. Which is why Jack and company had to spend the entire rest of the month of July going over what they all inherited, and who they were going to hire over. (Jack and company literally had people helping tally everthing down to the last refrigerator). People came in after that weekend only to find complete anarchy and people being called in to interviews. And now as far as they knew, Jack had taken over Atari Inc. and was now their boss because of the way Warner handled it. The first few days until Jack started locking down all the consumer buildings (including warehouses) were madness, people were driving up and loading up U-Hauls and vans full of stuff. Likewise a number of people started wiping out their directories on the mainframe. Ideally there should have been some form of normal transition - where all assets are mapped out, employees are explained the situation so they have time to start looking for jobs elsewhere, and a clear explination of how the Inc. assets are being split. As it was because of how Warner did it, Atari Corp and Atari Games were in litigation for years after arguing who owned what patents and such. ------------- But anyway, I don't think having AGames onboard (for licensing arcade ports) would have made a huge difference. Atari Games was not the arcade giant that AInc had been and Arcade games weren't the strongest driver of sales in the late 80s anyway. (Tengen was a pretty minor player in the 3rd gen console market, at least once you stripped out all licensed ports -namely Namco stuff) Albeit, perhaps AGames could have been useful for developing console specific games as well. (their arcade games were fairly notable nevertheless and would certainly have helped the limited library Atari had on the 7800 -the ST was getting pretty good 3rd party support by comparison-) The bigger problem is that Atari Corp hadn't taken on any of the former console game programming staff, though they did take most of the computer/game related staff. Now, that's in part due to TTL/ACorp's management decisions, but more to do with the lack of a balanced or well-planned transition from AInc to corp. (the same reason they also lost a lot of powerful engineering staff, didn't go into the exiting Advanced Technology prototypes, etc, etc) Note that Morgan would likely have had to lay off more AInc staff as reorganization progressed, but it would have been far more orderly vs the anarchy caused by Warner's management of the split. It also created a good deal of friction with AGames that lasted for years, and of course forced the delays with the 7800's release. (a properly handled transition could have meant the 7800 having almost no delay among other things) Once I learned that Atari Games was still a separate company, I began pestering Atari Corp. to license the Atari Games Corp. titles. I think I sent them a letter once a week requesting them to do so. Yes, publishing, but not developing. They could have published under different labels or licensed the games to others to publish. (like Atari Corp) That's the same loophole NEC and Sega used for bringing over some Japanese games from "locked out" developers. (though NEC screwed up by not pushing nearly as hard as they could -they probably had potential to be the Sony of the 4th generation with the vertical integration and megacorp clout if they'd invested proprly and established the proper management/marketing for the western divisions) Atari Inc and Warner had been a real mess, with the major problems surfacing in 1982 and deepening in '83. Morgan's arrival helped a lot with the exception of the hold on operations that delayed or canceled many major products in late '83. The change in management was badly needed though, but it's just a shame that he made that move and also that it took until mid 1983 for Atari Inc to get the lead management it needed. (had Kassar been replaced back in mid '82, they might have been able to head off the problems much sooner) OTOH, it's a shame a man like Kassar was put in charge in the first place (rather than someone with experience and skills well suited to the consumer/entertainment market and preferably with a decent general understanding of the electronics/computer markets as well -or at least advisory staff to provide such insight). He was at least a lot better than Bushnell as far as smart business decisions went. Of course, Warner's own dual management and bureaucracy screwed things up well beyond what Kassar was doing. (he formally turned down ET after Universal asked too much, but Warner went ahead with their own deal with Spielberg...) So, not only should Atari Inc have gotten a better president/CEO, but Warner probably should have made it a largely autonomous spin-off company (with controlling interest) rather than a direct subsidiary of Warner. That doesn't seem right about Atari Games Corp. having to license the "Atari" name and logo. I thought they had worldwide exclusive rights to the name and logo for use solely in arcades and Atari Corp. had worldwide exclusive rights for computers and home video games... [not counting Ataritel]. That's how it was always explained after the Tramiel acquisition. I guess it complicates matters if one wanted to market "Atari Games" t-shirts. I'd assume you'd only have to secure a licensing deal with Warner Bros. Interactive... Yes, Marty made a post about that too: And back to Tramiel buying AGames, it couldn't be done unless Warner was willing to part with it for more promisary notes: And another good post on the topic of the overall situation surrounding the split: Yes, there were mass layoffs at the beginning of June as part of Morgan's announced plans: http://www.nytimes.c...ome-office.html Are you the CEO of a multi-billion dollar company? Are you answering to shareholders about over 50% profit loss, and 400 million in losses alone just that 2nd quarter of '84? Losses coming from your former chief source of profit, that had been on a downward spiral since December of '82? And did you just get done staving off a hostile takeover, to which you had to pay out big time to avoid? I don't disagree with their decision to do something with Atari, I disagree with how it wound up being handled during the end of the process. The decision to sell wasn't done hurridly, they actually hired a firm to evaluate their (Warner's) situation in that January and they're the ones that recommended selling Atari and several other subsidiaries. Warner had been on an acquisition spree through the 70's and it was catching up with them. Per the firm's recommendation it had begun looking for possible buyers. I can't say that Morgan didn't know about it, because he didn't live in a bubble - the press knew Warner was in talks with Philips and others. That was however for the entire company, which conceivably would still allow Morgan to proceed as planned. What he was not aware of was the actual splitting of the company and the immediate sale of Consumer to Jack. He stated he had no idea of that until he walked in to the boardroom to sign the papers. Even Jack had been caught off guard for the whole thing. They had been in talks in May that fell through and then he gets a call the very end of June (days before they started the weekend long negotiations) asking if he's still interested. He didn't turn Atari around, Atari Inc. collapsed and was liquidated. He took the Consumer Division and folded it in to his company Tramel Technologies Ltd. (TTL) to form Atari Corporation. As part of the no money down deal he also took on Atari Inc.'s debt (which was chiefly from it's consumer operations), so Warner could get it off the books. Likewise as part of the deal, Warner took stock in the new company (not majority), just in case he managed to make things work with Atari Corporation. It was a win-win for them. They didn't sell Atari. They sold a division because they couldn't get anyone to buy the entire thing on their terms. What they wound up doing was paring Atari Inc. down to the original Coin-Op format it was when they first entered talks to buying it, and then spun that off with Namco as Atari Games. The corporate entity Atari Inc. itself existed for about two years after for legal purposes (lawsuits, collection attempts, etc.) I certainly agree there, but it's unethical but not illegal. It wouldn't be the first or last time a parent company does things without consulting the CEO of a subsidiary. You've got to be kidding. Amelio's reign was one of the worst in the history of the company and a point to it's complete lack of foundation. In fact the first thing Jobs had to do was completely reorganize Amelio's "foundation". And instead of an outside takeover, Amelio unknowingly set up for an inside one with the purchase of NeXT - and his own forced departure. That's pure boneheadness. Nothing done under Amelio's reign had impact on the future of Apple other than the purchase of NeXT which allowed his replacement to come in. He simply wanted access to a next generation OS, and instead got a next generation Apple via his replacement. Which they did. The only time I'm aware of shortage issues with the 7800 was during the initial stages of the relaunching (January '86 through that Summer) when they were relying primarily on '84 backstock until manufacturing operations started up again. During that time stores were selling out of all 7800 stock. It was completely resolved by September and the big Christmas season showdown. Which is why you're probably not CEO of a video game console company.

Yeah, Coleco was short sighted like Mattel and dumped it, but unlike Mattel, no one picked it up again. (a shame since it had a lot more long term potential than the Intellivision) There was a clone with dual SG-1000 and CV compatibility released in the US, but I think that's about it. (if Sega had stuck-in, I wonder if they could have taken advantage of some form of cooperation with Sega given the nearly identical hardware -a shame Coleco didn't managed the Adam more like the SC-3000 in some areas, that could have made a big difference; ie have the lowest end computers identical to the CV but with a keyboard and monitor/AV output -maybe some other peripheral ports or just the expansion port- and then have a mid-range model with expanded RAM but still a fairly bare bones form factor, and then something more like the higher-end desktop form factor of the historical adam -but much more modular and with different bundles, some with just the machine itself, others adding drives, printer, etc, and get rid of those funky tape drives in favor of more conventional tapes -much slower than the custom format, but on the higher end of contemporaries like the 3000 baud of the CoCo or Spectrum at "double speed"- and of course push for disk drives for the higher-end medium -perhaps double density from the start, maybe even IBM-like formatting) The MSX1 gives a fair impression of what the CV could have managed (albeit with a better stock sound chip and more RAM -in many cases ROM would displace that, in a few cases of software rendered effects, it might not). The SG-1000 to some extent too, though it doesn't seem to have been pushed as far as the colecovision in some cases even. (Sega's own arcade port of Pitfall II has choppy cell-wise vertical scrolling vs smooth scrolling on the Activision game)

Regarding manufacturing potentially moving back to the US in 1987, I have seem that mentioned a few times. I'd like to reference it, but I can't find any source for the information. Would you happen to have any reference to this that I could use? No, I'm not sure it happened, I've only seen references to ongoing plans for such in '87, like here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2N2BUTIpnDI See: 1:50 Curt Vendel and Marty (wgungfu) would know if anyone on the boards. Again, if that really was the case, it seems a bit unfortunate timing wise with the DRAM shortage and import tax added. (the 2 must have been separate -but conglomerating- issues since companies in Europe were also having troubles -but having manufacturing focused in Asia certainly should have helped offset things a bit) I was also a bit surprised to find that CSG was manufacturing their own DRAM. I knew they were producing most/all of the custom/support ICs used in CBM products, but hadn't realized they'd switched over to DRAM production as well. (I seem to recall motherboard scans of C64s with various 3rd party DRAM chips -not sure about Amiga, I don't think I've seen any high-res mobo shots of those) Actually, I seem to remember a lot of DRAM chips with TI insignias in CBM machines. (that what most amiga boards seem to have, but it's a bit low res so it may not be TI -doesn't look like MOS's insignia though -the CSG insignia looks a little like that in general size, but I'm not sure) Edit: OK, I'm not crazy, at least some Amigas didn't use CSG/MOS RAM chips: http://www.amiga-hardware.com/download_photos/a3000rev61mb_1_big.jpg (A1000, Panasonic) http://www.amiga-hardware.com/download_photos/cd32motherboard41.jpg (CD32, OKI Japan -also a fair portion of the chipset is 3rd party, not CSG) http://amiga.erkan.se/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/amiga-3000-motherboard-300x225.jpg (not sure, but it's not CSG or MOS -maybe Toshiba, whoever uses the "T" insignia) http://www.amiga-resistance.info/download_photos/a590_inside_big.jpg (OKI, again) http://amiga.resource.cx/photos/gallery/a1000pal.jpg (another Japanese company) http://geektechnique.org/images/amiga500-light-1.jpg (expansion board looks like it might be CSG, not sure) http://amiga.resource.cx/photos/gallery/a600rev15.jpg (NEC and some other Japanese company) http://www.rabayjr.com/Amiga/A1200%20Motherboard%20Rev1D.3.jpg (Panasonic) http://tomdalby.com/retro/images/a500_inside.jpg (OKI) http://www.faime.demon.co.uk/retro/images/500.1.jpg (Siemens) http://www.bboah.com/download_photos/a500mb_rev5_1.jpg (? but not CSG -seems like that may be the same as the one above that looks CSG-ish) http://www.bboah.com/download_photos/a500mb_Rev5_4.jpg (Siemens) There's a bunch here too: http://www.bboah.com/index.php?action=artikel&cat=7&id=1863&artlang=en So as far as I can see, CSG only provided minor supplementation of DRAM, if it supplied any at all, so I don't see how that could have been the deciding factor for the Amiga's price advantage. (assuming CSG could supplement things modestly, that would have helped some, but it seems that, if anything, it was more an issue of CBM cutting profit margins significantly) However, I'm still not convinced that CSG produced any DRAM at all, in which case they'd have no advantage at all over Atari in that respect. (just in other areas of vertical integration) And if I'm not mistaken, Siemens is a German company/conglomerate, so not all of those were Asian/Japanese companies either. (and also means that DRAM was still being competitively produced outside of Asia, just that US companies had abandoned DRAM) Unfortunately Atariforum's wiki seems to have lost their photo archives, but from other motherboards online, Atari seems to have used several of the same sources for DRAM as CBM. (Toshiba seems pretty significant)

^Disregard the link to the YS PC8801 music . . . that's a later game using the awesome YM2608, not the older YM2203. (3 more FM channels, 6 preprogrammed rhythm/percussion sample synth channels, 1 ADPCM channel and the same PSG -or "SSG" as Yamaha calls it)

A lot of those tricks would be poor on the ST, eating up proportionally much more CPU time if using the same interrupt method and would be no better than the AY in many cases. The tricks to push saw/triangle modulations might not work as such, but you can hack the envelope for that at no CPU cost. (and software envelopes are very CPU light by comparison -on the order of hundreds of interrups per second, if that, rather than thousands for modulations) You have 3 DAC channels to work with on the ST as it is and several interval timers that can be used more or less like POKEY's (higher resolution actually), but the problem is the 68k would lose a fair amount of CPU time doing that and it would be a much bigger trade-off in-game than on the A8. (6502 has extremely fast interrupts -also makes software PCM much more favorable via interrupts) So POKEY's volume modulation modes would only be moderately better than the AY's volume modulation: you get 4-bit linear vs 5-bit logarithmic (usually used as 4-bit logarithmic if single-channel), so you could get 4 rather than 3 channels, but that's also 1/3 more overhead. POKEY also can't do the high-res DAC hack that the AY can via look-up tables: using all 4 channels at 5-bit resolution and optimized look-up, you can reasonably approximate 8-bit resolution output or a bit better than that even before the granularity gets too nasty. (ie to the point where mixing to 8-bit and dropping sample res is preferable to mixing to higher res -I think 10 bit might be reasonably possible) Of course, the mixed hack is more CPU intensive by far than using separate hardware channels, thus you could manage much higher sample rates doing 3-channel volume modulation PCM than true MOD (or do a lot more other stuff while playing the digital music), similar for 4 4-bit channels as well. (of course, 4-bit samples also take up 1/2 the space of 8-bit ones ) It's not the look-up method that's the real kicker for overhead though, it's the fact that you have to software mix all the channels at a common playback rate and thus resample (scale) samples on the fly for notes. (thus if you pushed a single 8-bit MOD channel on the ST, it would be much less than 1/4 the resource of 4 channels, though a single plain 4-bit channel would be even less still due to lack of table look-up overhead -that's also why streaming PCM on the ST can be played at much higher rates than MOD, though most streaming stuff is pretty low rate due to the size it takes up anyway -might be better off left as 4-bit samples for that matter and double the sample rate) Just like if the ST had 4 8-bit DACs in it. Sure, you'd have better quality software MOD, but you wouldn't have it in-game. (the Lynx's sound chip would have been nice thoughm option for 8-bit DAC/volume modulation on 4 channels plus fairly flaxible chip synth capabilities when CPU resource is scarce) DMA audio and CPU brute-force DAC audio are very different things. The YM is worse in all cases, comparing to PAULA, this is no question. I question this. They're made for different purposes. Paula is for digital music mostly (by default: only) and YM/AY is for synthetic music mostly (again - by default: only). So in general, this comparison is as pointless as to compare: what is better - a sheaf-binder or a cucumber. Paula is a different animal entirely really, and it would have been extremely limited in an older machine with limited RAM. (granted there's some pretty impressive 8k MOD out there ) That's one of the reasons you didn't see more samples on 8-bits, not just the CPU resource, but the already constrained memory. (and for demos in titles and such, CPU resource is a non-issue, hence why you saw MODs in a fair amount of ST demo screens but not MOD/sample stuff on 8-bits -other than the occasional low quality fixed pitch percussion/chime/etc sample -like in stormlord on the C64) The AY should be very capable of software modulation for different waveforms (namely pulse), and of course it has the envelope to hack saw and triangle waves at low res. Even the rather crappy SN76489 would be just as capable at doing modulations like this: http://battleofthebits.org/arena/Entry/down%20and%20dirty/3657/ Though if you want non CPU heavy chip synth that still sounds awesome, there's lots of other options: http://battleofthebits.org/arena/Entry/Polaracer/3617/ (software envelopes are very CPU light even via interrupts since they're so infrequent compared to modulations/PCM -probably would have seen them a lot on the MSX, Speccy and CPC if they had useful timers available for such -a lot of NES games used them and better ST tunes did for sure . . . or maybe they do have programmable timer interrupts and I'm mistaken -the other option is software timed loops, easier in demos but tough to manage in game from what I understand -the envelope saw/triangle hack would be just as realistic to push on the 8-bits though -or the Intellivision for that matter ) It's got some notable advantages over POKEY and even some over SID (stereo, 3 channel plus simultaneous noise, 12-bit frequency resolution over POKEY's 8-bit normally, envelope POKEY lacks -without CPU help, etc). And modulations are nothing specific to POKEY, POKEY's built-in timers makes it possible on the A8 where it otherwise wouldn't be without cycle timed loops (no other timers), but PWM can be done on anything including a beeper. (in fact that's pretty much all you can practically do with a beeper beyond square waves) The fact that 6502 systems are extremely interrupt friendly is probably why you see the modulation stuff more there (or would have if the A8 had gotten more support back then ), but the ST has plenty of interval timers to push . . . but the overhead is much greater by comparison. (ie you'll eat up a lot of CPU time doing interrupt PWM on the ST, the gap from PWM to software PCM with the 68k is a lot smaller than the 6502 -though the 6502 is also much better suited to interrupt driven PCM as well) Same problem with Z80 based systems except I think most of those lacked interval timers anyway. (so you'd have to resort to Apple-II type tight coding instead, though THAT would indeed avoid the interrupt overhead problem and make it far more competitive with the 6502 -even the 6502 would be significantly more efficent with tight cycle counted loops, but the gain over interrupts isn't nearly as extreme as some other architectures) You mean like true AHX using CPU generated waveforms? (or does AHX cheat with samples?) It would take a lot less CPU resource on the ST to push modulation on the AY. (I wonder why games didn't opt for that fairly often 0you'd have to space some CPU resource, of course, but less than doing PCM in-game, which some did push -mmuch more often too) Hell, doing Spectrum style AY digital music would be a lot less intensive than MOD too, more so if you used only 1 or 2 channels rather than all 3. (given the overhead from interrupts, single-channel PCM synth probably wouldn't be a massive jump over PWM stuff on the ST, or the same if you dropped the peak sample rate a bit -and with 1 PCM channel you'd have 2 channels+noise left, and that PCM channel could be switched between PCM and chip synth as needed ) I wonder if some games would have pushed in-game 3 channel digital synth (or at least 1 or 2 channel) if Atari had offered 12/16 MHz models from the start (or well before the STe at least). They'd probably need chip-only modes to make things run faster optionally. (especially for 8 MHz users) That's something POKEY should definitely be better for though, plain 4-bit DACs rather than the logarithmic stuff, and up to 4 channels. (with really good formatting and preprocessing, the AY probably would be pretty good though, and the samples you use seem to match that -even with the coarse 2dB volume steps on the SN PSG, Sega managed to push out some surprisingly decent 3 kHz samples in Afterburner II on the MD -only game to do that on the MD AFIK, others used the 8-bit DAC mode on the YM2612) That sounds like wavetable synthesis, or maybe granular synthesis of some sort. (either adding together or sequentially building up waveforms -real wavetable synth mind you, not the misnomer applied to sample synth) Or do you just mean a selection of short samples with extremely tight loop times (no adding or compiling), like the PC Engine/TG-16? That would do it too and is one of Paula's shortcomings vs actual sample synthesizers. (ie the SNES's sound system, Ricoh chip in the Sega CD/FM Towns/etc, etc) That's also something that a 6502 would have been a lot better at. (especially if you're using timer interrupts to set loop times) A shame Atari didn't use the YM2203 though, that would have been pretty awesome, even on the STe along with the DMA sound. (definitely more of an advantage over the Amiga, especially in the right hands) Fully backwards compatible with the YM2149/AY and similar footprint too, so could have made sense to introduce later on even. (even if the price wasn't an issue, it was new in '85 and may not have been available -NEC probably had top priority for the PC8801 series) It would have been really interesting to see what the better EU (and probably a few US) composers/programmers came up with compared to what the Japanese managed on the 8801. (not to mention it would have given arcade-like sound hardware -3 channels of the arcade standard YM2151, though the YM2203 itself was occasionally used in the arcade too) http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=D43F807A6A30062E (a lot of those are the PCE CD tracks, look for the PC88 versions, like ) Of course there's the Megadrive to give some indication of what they'd have managed, but that's got 3 more FM channels and weaker PSG. (or 2 more FM channels, weaker PSG, and 1 software driven 8-bit DAC channel)

Why not just have the full things assembled overseas? (or at least the circuit board+RAM, if not the entire motherboard -then do final assembly and packaging in the US) Atari Inc had already moved a lot of production over seas (especially Hong Kong iirc) and Atari Corp had been using that as well, but I've seen mentions of plans to shift back to US manufacturing more heavily in 1987, and if that happened, it would have been pretty sour luck on Atari's part given the DRAM issue. (pushing for continued overseas manufacturing could have really paid off in that respect -or at least manufacturing of the motherboards and such, leaving final assembly and packaging in the US)